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Introduction1
Today, America speaks anew to the peoples of the world. All who 
live in tyranny and hopelessness can know the United States will 
not ignore your oppression or excuse your oppressors. When you 
stand for your liberty, we will stand with you. 
– President George W. Bush
second inaugural address, January 2005.
Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch 
– President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
on the authoritarian (but anti-communist) 
president of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza Garcia.
As the last US military personnel left the Karshi-Khanabad airbase 
in the Central Asian country of Uzbekistan on 21 November 2005, 
policymakers in Washington must have been shaking their heads 
in dismay. After four years as a staunch and strategically important 
ally in the war on terror, President Islam Karimov evicted US forces 
from the country, halted all cooperation on counterterrorism, and 
closed down the majority of American-funded nongovernmental 
organizations operating in the country. The base eviction marked 
the low point in relations between the two countries and Washington 
1 I would like to extend a heartfelt thank you to Helge Blakkisrud and his colleague 
Stina Torjesen from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). 
Also, a nod of thanks goes to Svein Melby and Anna Therese Klingstedt, both of 
the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, for their kind assistance and helpful 
comments.
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was left with few opportunities to advance its political objectives, 
which included the continued use of the airbase as a logistics cen-
ter for ongoing US/NATO operations in Afghanistan. Other US 
policy goals included counterterrorism, non-proliferation, impro-
ving the human rights record of the Karimov regime, and fostering 
democratic change in Uzbekistan in the interest of long-term peace 
and stability. It was an ambitious agenda and diverse almost to the 
point of being counterproductive, especially in an area of the world 
depicted by many analysts as a huge geopolitical chessboard.
The United States initially conducted a broad, multifaceted 
foreign policy towards the newly independent Central Asia coun-
tries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Tajikistan. From the late 1990s onwards, however, the US nurtu red 
a closer relationship with Uzbekistan for strategic reasons relating 
to counterterrorism. After the 11 September 2001 terro rist attacks 
in the United States and the subsequent confl ict in Afghanistan, 
the region became crucial to US military planners and Uzbekistan 
became an important ally in the American-led war on terror. 
Located in the heart of Central Asia, the republic of Uzbekistan 
drifted steadily towards authoritarianism after gaining indepen-
dence from the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991. President Islam 
Karimov has led the country since that time, steadily conso li da-
ting his power through the offi ce of the presidency. Most inter na-
tional observers agree that the Karimov regime does not respect 
uni versally recognized human rights, does not conduct free and 
fair elections, suppresses free speech, press and assembly by Uzbek 
citizens, arrests and convicts individuals on political or religious 
grounds, and engages in systematic torture of prisoners.
For a country such as the United States, whose leadership con-
sistently and forcefully advocates the spreading of democracy, 
freedom, and human rights throughout the globe, a close relation-
ship with Uzbekistan was not without complications. A slew of 
US-funded democracy and civil society programs had taken root 
throughout Central Asia in the early 1990s, aimed at encouraging 
the spread of liberal ideals and institutions. The US seemed to 
face a policy dilemma: encourage democracy and human rights 
through these programs which were perceived as threatening by 
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the Karimov regime, or pursue American security interests which 
depended on the cooperation of the repressive government in Tash-
kent. The main question this study seeks to answer, therefore, is 
this: How did the United States balance strategic interests, human 
rights concerns, and democracy promotion in its foreign policy 
toward Uzbekistan from 1995 to 2005?
Uzbekistan represents an interesting ‘test case’ for US policy 
precisely because of the consistently poor human rights record of 
President Karimov’s government. The regime’s uncompromisingly 
autocratic nature serves as a constant variable amidst a dynamic 
security environment with fl uctuating American interests. Washing-
ton needed the support and cooperation of the Karimov regime to 
pursue US strategic interests, presenting a potential confl ict with 
other more normative policy goals. How did the incorporation of 
the normative components of US foreign policy change in relation 
to the dynamic security environment? Did the shift in leadership 
from Presidents Clinton to Bush result in policy adjustments? 
How did the sudden emergence of Uzbekistan as a vital ally in the 
war on terror after September 2001 affect the composition of US 
policy? These are a few of the questions that should be answered 
by a focused review of US foreign policy towards Uzbekistan.
This study highlights United States foreign policy towards 
Uzbekistan during the period 1995–2005. The year 1995 marks 
the beginning of a more active US role in Uzbekistan, including 
the fi rst year some military aid was granted, Uzbekistan’s initial 
parti cipation in the NATO-led Partnership for Peace program, 
and the visit to Tashkent by Defense Secretary William Perry. 
The study includes the ending date of 2005 in order to capture 
the most recent developments possible, most notably the violent 
events in Andijan and the eviction of US forces from the airbase at 
Karshi-Khanabad, both of which are useful in shedding light on 
US policy choices. The time period in focus will be divided into 
four segments, each dealing with an important juncture in US-
Uzbek relations when policy decisions revealed how human rights, 
democratization, and security were prioritized. 
The main focus for this study centered on the formation and 
execution of American foreign policy. Accordingly, a good portion 
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of the primary sources material originated from State Depart ment 
and congressional documents outlining US foreign aid. In addition, 
interviews were conducted with a range of subjects, including key 
US embassy personnel (the US ambassador, the assistant defense 
attaché, and the USAID coordinator), the directors of a number 
of US-funded non-governmental organizations, and Uzbek opposi-
tion leaders.2 Preceding the empirical data and analysis are two 
brief chapters containing useful background information and ter-
minology. Each of the next four chapters then focuses on a pe-
riod of US-Uzbek relations and analyzes the discussion, forma-
tion, and execution of US policy during crucial junctures in the 
relationship – times when Washington was forced to make tough 
choices regarding its interests and how to prioritize them. A fi nal 
concluding chapter sums up the fi ndings and offers some tentative 
lessons that can be drawn from US actions in Uzbekistan. 
2 Further information concerning the interviews, including a list of interview subjects, 
can be made available by contacting the author.




A study of US foreign policy must fi rst address the question of what 
exactly makes up the foreign policy of the United States and its 
prin ciple actors. The three branches of the US federal government 
are the legislative (Congress, which makes the laws), the executive 
(the president, who enforces the laws), and the judicial (the courts, 
which interprets the laws). Constitutionally and historically, the 
judiciary has little role in the formation and implementation of 
foreign policy and the focus thereby falls on the remaining two 
branches of government.
According to Article Two of the US Constitution, the president 
is designated commander-in-chief of the armed forces and, through 
the powers to negotiate treaties and appoint ambassadors, serves 
as the chief diplomat for the United States. Additionally, the 
prominent nature of the Oval Offi ce automatically ensures that 
spe eches and policy proposals garner widespread attention and 
thus allows the president to set the foreign policy agenda. The US 
Congress, through Article One of the Constitution, is granted the 
power to create and fund the armed forces along with the power 
to declare war. The Congress (more specifi cally the US Senate) 
also must confi rm diplomatic appointments and ratify treaties, 
responsibilities that serve to limit presidential power. Histori cally, 
congressional activity within the realm of foreign policy has mainly 
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been in an oversight capacity.3 The legislature allows the president 
a great deal of leeway in conducting the country’s foreign policy, 
and exercises its power mostly through control of the purse strings, 
as all spending bills must be approved by Congress. 
The executive branch has become increasingly powerful within the 
past decades, due to a professed need to respond quickly to rapidly 
developing events around the world and the inherent inability of 
a legislature to act quickly and decisively.4 Congressional attempts 
to curb this trend towards greater presidential authority in the 
foreign policy arena include the War Powers Act (1974), which set 
limits on the presidential deployment of US forces.5 Furthermore, 
the political orientation of the legislature can also be decisive: a 
popular president with congressional support can act in almost 
any way he sees fi t, while a White House which faces a combative 
Congress may be limited by which foreign policy initiatives the 
legislature is willing to fund. In addition to possible disagreements 
between the president and Congress on foreign policy issues, the 
president and his Cabinet and staff do not necessarily constitute a 
united front on foreign policy either. 
In any case, the actors most involved in the formation of US 
foreign policy are the president and his Cabinet, whose policy-
making toolbox includes policy speeches and written state ments, 
diplomatic negotiations, foreign operations budget pro posals 
that require congressional approval, and other executive actions 
not requiring congressional consent. The US Congress con trib-
utes to and infl uences foreign policy primarily through foreign 
appropriations legislation and oversight authority in the form 
of hearings, treaty ratifi cation, congressional fact-fi nding inves-
tigations, and offi cial visits. While the formal structures of US 
3 Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, US Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: 
Routledge, 2001).
4 Some historians have warned of the dangers of the executive branch wielding so 
much power. See for example Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (New 
York: Popular Library, 1974).
5 In practical terms, however, this restriction (placing a 60 day limit on the 
presidential use of the military abroad, with the possibility of a 30 day extension) 
has had limited effect as the withdrawal of US forces becomes problematic once 
they are deployed, in addition to the speed with which recent military operations 
have generally been conducted.
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foreign policy may appear fairly straightforward, the substance of 
foreign policy has always been a source of contention.
Disagreements over the content of US 
foreign policy
Since its creation the United States has represented liberty, 
freedom and democratic ideals. The philosophical foundations 
of the country rest on these principles and are embedded in the 
political and legal framework set forth by the US Constitution. 
The US is seen by its citizens to have something unique – a system 
of government based on the protection of individual rights such 
as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.6 This idea of the 
American experience as something special represents an idealized 
self-image the US collectively holds, where the country feels a 
responsibility toward the rest of the world.7 These rights were cast 
in universal terms and therefore applied not only to US citizens, 
but to the rest of humanity as well. The self-imposed burden of 
the US, therefore, was to spread this form of “political morality”.8 
Some political leaders questioned the wisdom of taking on such a 
missionary role and actively championing the cause of democracy 
overseas, among them John Quincy Adams, who said in 1821: 
“Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or 
shall be unfurled, there will be America’s heart, her benedictions, 
and her prayers. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to 
destroy.”9 Almost a century later, in contrast, President Woodrow 
Wilson’s fi rm belief in US exceptionalism laid the foundation for 
an increased US role in international affairs. 
Disagreements over US policy take other forms than the 
engagement/isolation dichotomy illustrated by Adams and 
Wilson. Svein Melby identifi ed four main intellectual lines of 
6 Dobson and Marsh, US Foreign Policy.
7 Svein Melby, Amerikansk utenrikspolitikk [American foreign policy] (Oslo: Tano, 
1995).
8 Dobson and March, US Foreign Policy, p. 2.
9 Quoted in Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2001), p. 238.
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confl ict consistently running through US foreign policy.10 First, 
disagreement stems from a belief by some policymakers that work-
ing through international institutions (and a willingness to be bound 
by them) will always best accomplish foreign policy goals, versus 
those who see cooperation with those institutions as valuable only 
when it furthers the interests of the US. Another divergence among 
policymakers occurs over the use of military and economic tools 
(hard power) to secure US interests, versus using diplomatic means 
(soft power). A third disagreement results when those committed 
to preserving the status quo (i.e. the current political and security 
arrangement) clash with others intent on changing the internatio-
nal system. Finally, a long-running confl ict exists between those 
stri ving to remain consistent to the idealistic principles of freedom 
and democracy (despite some costs to US interests) versus those 
who see the need to act pragmatically in the unforgiving world 
of international politics (in order to protect those same interests), 
as illustrated by the quotations at the beginning of this section.11 
This fi nal confl ict, pitting idealism against pragmatism, suggests a 
foreign policy compromise whereby a balance is reached between 
the demands of international realpolitik and the normative 
standards upon which the US was founded. Henry Kissinger wrote 
in a recent work: 
The ultimate dilemma of the statesman is to strike a balance be twe-
en values and interests and, occasionally, between peace and justice. 
The dichotomy postulated by many between morality and interest, 
between idealism and realism, is one of the standard clichés of the 
ongoing debate over international affairs. No such stark choice is, 
in fact, available.12
10 Svein Melby, Bush-revolusjonen i amerikansk utenrikspolitikk [The Bush 
Revolution in American foreign policy] (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2001).
11 In addition to these four confl ict areas, Melby fi lls out his typology by identifying 
three main perspectives held by US policymakers: institutionalists (desiring to work 
through international institutions), realists (desiring pragmatic and realpolitik 
action), and expansionists (focused on spreading American political ideals).
12 Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? p. 286.
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US Policy and international relations theory
For IR theorists and policymakers alike, the theoretical perspective 
employed informs how national interests are determined and 
which strategies to employ. Classical realists in the style of Hans 
Morgenthau, viewing the world through the lens of an anarchic 
system in which the pursuit of power is necessary to ensure the 
state’s survival, predict an instrumental foreign policy based on 
self-interest.13 Accordingly, proponents of realism place little stock 
in normative issues, prioritizing security concerns and explaining 
away idealistic rhetoric as mere instrumental speech. This realist 
view is one possible interpretation of US policy explored in this 
study.
Henry Kissinger warned against becoming preoccupied with 
stability, where “an excessively pragmatic policy will be empty 
of vision and humanity”.14 Nevertheless, he goes on to note that 
policymakers must make compromises and focus on that which is 
possible to accomplish, therefore pragmatism must be the order 
of the day.15 Morgenthau’s brand of realism leaves much open to 
interpretation, especially in arriving at fi rm conceptualizations of 
power and therefore national interest. Foreign policy goals “can 
run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued 
or might possibly pursue”.16 His insistence that foreign policy 
goals are broadly defi ned and dependent on present circumstances 
leaves an opening for non-security interests to be incorporated 
into foreign policy goals if it furthers the security of the state. 
According to John Mearsheimer, non-security interests may be 
incorporated into a state’s foreign policy if they do not confl ict 
with the state’s primary goals of power and security.17 
This refl ects the rationality aspect of realism. Rationality is 
by defi nition transitive in nature, meaning that states rank their 
13 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 4th edition (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1968).
14 Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1974), 
p. 259.
15 Ibid.
16 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 9.
17 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Co., 2001), p. 46.
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preferences and formulate policies based on those rankings. While 
security issues are always given the highest priority, are there 
matters of national interest lower down on the list that might 
be tended to if the state’s security is assured? Thomas Carothers 
occupies this intellectual middle ground, arguing that US policy 
for decades has been 
a semirealist balancing of sometimes competing and sometimes 
complementary interests. Where democracy appears to fi t in well 
with US security and economic interests, the United States promotes 
democracy. Where democracy clashes with other signifi cant inte-
rests, it is downplayed or even ignored.18 
Carothers’ statement represents the second possible interpretation 
of US policy examined by this study.
As some analysts have pointed out, the rhetoric emanating from 
the White House and the State Department can hardly be described 
as the language of realpolitik, such that realists would use. After 
the terrorist attacks of September 2001, President George W. Bush 
characterized the fi ght against terrorism as “the fi ght of all who 
believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom”.19 The 
2002 National Security Strategy of the United States lists “political 
and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and 
respect for human dignity” as the recipe “to help make the world 
not just safer but better”.20 In his second inaugural address, Bush 
proclaimed: “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly de-
pends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for 
peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world”.21 
How can such language be explained? 
Realists maintain that the United States presents itself in an 
idealistic manner while acting in accordance to realist principles. 
With its overwhelming focus on power and national security, 
18 Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), p. 70.
19 George W Bush, Address to a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States 
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 20 September 2001 (The White 
House [online 31 Oct 2005]).
20 “The National Security Strategy of the United States”, September 2002, The White 
House ([online 31 Oct, 2006]).
21 “President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address, ‘There Is No Justice without 
Freedom’”, 21 January 2005, Washington Post [online 2 Nov 2006].
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however, realism has always been unpopular with the United States 
public, which has been raised on the idea of an American moral 
mission. Founded on principles of freedom, justice, and democracy, 
Americans view such moral elements as universal and perceive the 
mission of the US to be the propagation of these principles.22 US 
foreign policy is therefore usually framed in idealistic and moral 
terms, while, according to Mearsheimer, 
the elites who make national security policy speak mostly the 
language of power not that of principle, and the United States acts 
in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic. 
In essence, a discernable gap separates public rhetoric from the 
actual conduct of American foreign policy.23 
Morgenthau makes a similar point, observing 
politicians have an ineradicable tendency to deceive themselves 
about what they are doing by referring to their policies not in 
terms of power but in terms of either ethical and legal principles or 
biological necessities.24
The other alternative, of course, is that the United States does in 
fact include normative, idealistic elements in its foreign poli cy. 
Colin Dueck suggests that during the election campaign candi-
date Bush distanced himself from the seemingly idealistic and 
mult ilateral approach of the Clinton years, while as president he 
has gradually reincorporated idealistic elements into his foreign 
policy.25 An analysis of statements made by leading members of 
the Bush Administration reached a similar conclusion, that the US 
has “trumpeted” its “commitment to freedom, human rights and 
good relations among the major powers” since 9/11.26 Consistently 
recognizing the importance of (and actively promoting) human 
rights and democratic principles alongside security issues runs 
counter to the tenants of realist thought, which therefore offers 
little explanation for such observations. The soaring language of the 
22 Dobson and Marsh, US Foreign Policy since 1945.
23 John Mearsheimer, “Liberal Talk, Realist Thinking”, University of Chicago 
Magazine, vol. 94, no. 3 (2002) (University of Chicago [online 1 Nov 2006]).
24 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 84.
25 Colin Dueck, “Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000–2004”, 
Review of International Studies, vol. 30, no. 4 (2004): 511–535.
26 Michael J. Mazarr, “George W. Bush, Idealist”, International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 3 
(2003): 503–522.
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Bush Administration points toward the academic archrival of realist 
thought – liberalism. Scholars advancing a liberalist interpretation 
of international relations, including the likes of Michael Doyle 
and Andrew Moravcsik, have argued that individual freedoms are 
secured through the representative institutions of the state, which 
in turn creates a system of interdependent states predisposed 
toward cooperation, human progress, and a democratic peace.27 
Human rights and democracy are therefore prioritized, viewed 
by liberalists as crucial building blocks to an international system 
based on institutions and cooperation. A US foreign policy built on 
these principles becomes the third and fi nal possible interpretation 
considered in this study.
It would be, mildly stated, a gross oversimplifi cation to assume 
that all those in the US foreign policymaking community pressing 
for human rights improvements in Uzbekistan supported a libera list 
view of world politics, and that those favoring security cooperation 
are staunch realists. However, the prioritization of normative goals, 
especially at the expense of practical security interests, reveals a 
policy position that can be compared much more favorably to 
the broad conceptual framework of liberalist international theory 
than to realist thought. Similarly, most supporters of the general 
framework of realism almost certainly prefer an interest-driven 
approach towards Uzbekistan, unencumbered by normative 
burdens that may not be in the immediate US national interest. 
The issues prioritized by policymakers in the present reveals 
something about how they envision the future and which policy 
path to choose. Such theoretical labels, carefully applied in a 
limited manner, simply provide a type of shorthand by which the 
goals of policymakers might be categorized.
27 See, for example, Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, no. 3 (1983): 205–235 and Andrew 
Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Relations”, International Organizations, vol. 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–553.
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Defi ning the Terms: Prioritization in US 
foreign policy
For this study, the expenditure of foreign assistance dollars and the 
use of political capital are the two primary indicators of whether 
an issue is made a US foreign policy priority. The fi rst indicator is 
a straightforward observation of how much of the United States 
budget was devoted to programs that address and/or promote 
a particular issue. The second indicator is less quantifi able, and 
deals with what the US was willing to sacrifi ce in order to pursue 
a particular issue – what did it cost the US politically? Did the US 
take actions that displeased allies, led to diplomatic crises, or forced 
the US to compromise or negotiate on other issues because of the 
prioritization? Both indicators deal with cost. Pursuing US interests 
when they are cost-free is painless and requires little prioritization, 
while continuing to pursue the same interests at some cost reveals 
their importance. Connecting the above discussion of foreign poli-
cy actions to that of prioritization, this study will examine the 
concrete actions of the United States and look for prioritization 
of the issues of human rights, democracy and security using the 
indicators of US dollars spent and political capital expended. 
Neither are perfect measures of prioritization and preference in 
foreign policy. The director of one nongovernmental organization 
in Uzbekistan acknowledged that oftentimes the phrase ‘less is 
more’ applies to democracy assistance.28 An overabundance of 
cash can attract the participation of those more interested in eco-
no mic gain than democratic reform, while low levels of funding 
ensure participants’ sincerity and commitment to democratic 
i deals. Military assistance is equally complex and US-implemented 
training programs incorporate human rights principles.29 The ease 
28 Interview conducted by the author in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, March 2006.
29 Some analysts argue, as Kurt Meppen does (Kurt Meppen, “US-Uzbek Bilateral 
Relations: Policy Options” in Anatomy of a Crisis: US–Uzbekistan Relations, 
2001–2005, Svante Cornell ed., Silk Road Paper – Central Asia-Caucasus Institute 
Silk Road Studies Program (Johns Hopkins University-SAIS and Uppsala University, 
2006 [online 1 Nov 2006]), pp. 13–43), that military training by Western countries 
can be useful in spreading democratic ideals and respect for human rights, while 
others, including Thomas Carothers (Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy 
Abroad (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999)) 
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of measuring the availability and expenditure of political capital 
also varies considerably. In many instances, a conscious choice not 
to press a country on matters of interest to the US (in other words, 
a failure to spend political capital) is easier to spot than its use in 
private diplomacy where the effects (the possible gain or loss to US 
interests) are diffi cult to identify and attribute to one specifi c act. 
Therefore, while both funding levels and use of political capital 
(or lack of it) are employed as measures of US priorities in this 
study, quite simply because they are the best indicators publicly 
available, these types of measurements should not be considered 
by any means absolute. 
Defi ning security interests
How security interests are identifi ed depends on the theoretical 
perspective being applied. As mentioned earlier, classical realists 
are preoccupied with military capability and other factors that 
make up their power base. Any threat to these sources of power, 
or threats to the sovereignty of the state, can constitute a security 
concern and can be prioritized by the US. The end of the Cold 
War, however, has led some scholars to question the usefulness of 
a purely military/materialistic approach to security issues. Non-
traditional threats in the form of terrorism, crime, uncontrolled 
immigration, environmental disasters, and economic crises are 
increasingly viewed as security issues.30 This type of security con-
cern – and the dynamic nature of security in general – is more 
easily incorporated into the liberalist perspective. 
According to liberalists, the interests of individuals and groups 
within the society determine national interests. In this perspective 
a state’s representative institutions (and therefore its interests) 
are “constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction 
and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors”.31 Therefore, 
“in a democracy, the national interest is simply what citizens, 
point to abuses by military units led by US-trained commanders in Turkey, 
Indonesia, and throughout Central America as counterexamples.
30 David Baldwin, “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War”, World Politics, 
vol. 48, no. 1 (1995): 117–141. 
31 Andrew Moravcsik “Taking Preferences Seriously…”: 518.
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after proper deliberation, say it is (…) it is broader than vital 
security in terests.”32 So while classical realism addresses security 
issues in purely materialistic terms of capabilities, liberalism sees 
a dynamic process where security issues are fl uid and dependent 
on which actors are most effective in infl uencing foreign policy. 
This is not to say that liberalists would not agree with realists on 
what constitutes a security threat at any given time, only that the 
security concerns of realists are fi xed: survival of the state and 
protection of the state’s national interests. The liberalist view of 
security interests most likely includes this as well, but interprets 
the state’s national interests more broadly.
Identifying human rights policy
Although the United States has long professed an interest in 
promoting human rights and democracy, the appearance of these 
issues in a concrete way in American foreign policy is more recent. 
While the post-war Marshall Plan (1948–51) infused Europe with 
development dollars from the United States (with the intention 
of rebuilding the continent as a bulwark against the Soviets), US 
development aid was not institutionalized until the 1961 Foreign 
Assistance Act that established the US Agency for International 
Development.33 This institutionalizing process continued under 
Pre si dents Carter, Reagan and Clinton.34 The existence of the Bu-
reau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the US executive 
branch, along with legal requirements concerning human rights 
and foreign aid, ensure that normative issues are a well-established 
component of US policy. That the United States funds efforts in 
other sovereign states with the goal of promoting internal changes 
to their system of government should not be simply taken for gran-
ted. It is a signifi cant international development that alters the 
substance of foreign policy.
32 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), p. 139.
33 United States Agency for International Development ([online Oct–Dec 2005])
34 Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).
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Attention to human rights has become increasingly prevalent in 
foreign policy. As Janne Haaland Matlary noted, 
with the democratization of foreign policy and transparency of 
business life, there has arisen a great interest in human rights. The 
legitimation and justifi cation of foreign policy which are offered 
are increasingly those of human rights.35 
States that do not protect the human rights of its citizens (human 
security) – states which are authoritarian in nature or failed states 
– are considered less legitimate by the international community.36 
The standard of Westphalian non-intervention, where the sanctity 
of the sovereign state is paramount, has shifted. Therefore, it is 
becoming more accepted that the West intervenes in these states 
to promote human rights, not through the hard power tool of 
military force, rather “the tools that are used in foreign policy 
are the other ones: diplomacy, cooperation, criticism in bilateral 
and multilateral contexts, etc. These tools are called here ‘soft’ 
power tools”.37 The United States not only uses the rhetoric of 
human rights to justify policies, it actively promotes them through 
diplomatic efforts. This trend has resulted in a multifaceted for-
eign policy that incorporates normative goals alongside more tra-
ditional national interests, and therefore an increasing pressure to 
balance them. 
If one maintains that a normative issue such as human rights 
is prioritized over other foreign policy goals, how might it be 
expressed in concrete policy choices? What type of actions can 
one expect to see in the empirical data? A thorough analysis 
of this can be found in a collection of case studies published in 
2004 entitled Implementing U.S. Human Rights Policy. In the 
concluding chapter, aptly titled “What Works?”, Debra Liang-
Fenton lists nine tools used by US policymakers: private and 
public diplomacy, country reports by the US State Department, 
congressional actions, cultural and scholarly exchanges, sanctions 
and incentives, democracy building, symbolic actions, and use 
35 Janne Haaland Matlary, Intervention for Human Rights in Europe (London: 
Palgrave, 2002), p. 5 (original emphasis).
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid, p. 31.
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of the media.38 Activity on these fronts can constitute an active 
hu man rights agenda and would be the type of policy choices 
included in US foreign policy towards Uzbekistan if such issues 
were prioritized. 
Promoting democracy in US foreign policy
Just as human rights concerns are a relatively recent addition to 
US foreign policy, so too is the methodical pursuit of building 
and strengthening democracies outside the US. The promotion of 
democratic ideals and institutions as a component of US foreign 
policy was set in motion in the 1960s under President Kennedy as a 
way to combat communism, and gradually became institutionalized 
over the following decades.39 The three categories of what Thomas 
Carothers refers to as the US “democracy template” are elections, 
institutions, and civil society.40 Programs within these categories 
may include electoral aid, legislative assistance, nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) development and media support.41 In a 
country like Uzbekistan, an authoritarian state with few func tion-
ing democratic institutions, programs to strengthen civil society 
are emphasized with the goal of laying a foundation for the 
development of a democratic society in the future. 
The main conduit of democracy aid from the US government is 
through the US Agency for International Development (USAID), an 
independent agency within the federal government. As mentioned 
earlier, other departments also have a democracy component in 
their programs, including the Defense Department. The majority 
of democracy promotion aid, however, is represented in the yearly 
USAID budgets, which will be used to determine the levels of 
aid for these programs. The complex process of valuating the 
effectiveness of democracy building strategies falls outside the focus 
of this study, and it will be assumed that US policymakers believed 
USAID programs represented a reasonably good approach. Apart 
38 Debra Liang-Fenton, ed., Implementing U.S. Human Rights Policy (Washington 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), p. 436.
39 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad.
40 Ibid, p. 66.
41 Ibid.
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from USAID funding levels, commitment to democracy promo tion 
will be measured by observing the amount of diplomatic pressure 
placed on the Uzbek government to institute reforms and criticisms 
leveled at the regime when such steps are not taken. In any event, 
the realities facing US policymakers in Uzbekistan at the onset of 
bilateral relations in 1995 were anything but democratic.
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Chapter 2
Background on Uzbekistan 
1991–95
Independence and domestic politics
When the Supreme Soviet granted Uzbekistan its independence 
in August 1991, President Islam Karimov had already secured 
a fi rm grip on political power. Appointed First Secretary of the 
Com munist Party of Uzbekistan in 1989 and elected president of 
Uzbekistan by the parliament the following year, Karimov faci li-
tated the smooth transfer of authoritarian control from Moscow 
to Tashkent.42 With the Communist Party banned after the failed 
1991 coup attempt in Moscow, the Communist Party of Uzbekistan 
was simply renamed the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan 
(PDPU), and the old bureaucracy continued to exist as before in 
the new republic.43
Any political party that represented a signifi cant challenge to 
Karimov’s rule was quickly discredited and banned. The fi rst oppo-
sition party, Birlik (“Unity”), arose just prior to independence 
and focused on Uzbek nationalism and multiparty democracy. 
Disagreements over political tactics within Birlik led to the cre-
ation of a new party, Erk (“Freedom”) headed by the poet Salay 
42 Shahram Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, 
Islamism, and Washington’s Security Agenda (London: Zed Books, 2005).
43 Annette Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional 
Order”, International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 3 (2004): 485–502.
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Madaminov. Better known by the pseudonym Muhammad Salih, 
he ran against Karimov in the 1991 presidential elections and 
garnered just over twelve percent of the vote in an election many 
observers regarded as neither free nor fair.44 Increased government 
pressure and harassment directed at both parties culminated with 
the arrest of Muhammad Salih in April 1993. Released af ter 
widespread international protest, Salih went into exile and even-
tually settled in Norway. As the International Crisis Group grim ly 
observed: “By the middle of 1993, all opposition political groups 
have been banned and their leaders were in exile or prison.”45 
In their place, a slew of political parties emerged which gave an 
appearance of multiparty democracy. Adolat (“Justice”), Miliy 
Tiklanish (“National Renaissance”), and Fidokorlar (“Self-
sacrifi cers”) adopted basically identical platforms and openly pled-
ged their loyalty to Karimov.46
The existing structures of political power in Uzbekistan, which 
heavily favor the presidency in its distribution of power, became 
formalized with the 1992 constitution. The document allowed 
Karimov to appoint (and dismiss) ministers, cabinet offi cials, parli-
ament, judges and regional governmental offi cials.47 Although 
many of these powers are contingent on the acquiescence of the 
Uzbek parliament (called the Oliy Majlis), it has rarely, if ever, 
chal lenged the authority of the President. Karimov’s control even 
ex tends to the local administrative levels, which in turn infl uence 
the composition and therefore the loyalty of the Oliy Majlis. 
44 International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan at Ten: Repression and Instability, Asia 
Report, no. 21 (21 August 2001) (ICG [online 1 Nov 2006]) and Akbarzadeh, 
Uzbekistan and the United States.
45 International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan at Ten, p. 6. Both Birlik and Erk have 
formed their own human rights organization in Uzbekistan: the Human Rights 
Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU) and the Independent Human Rights Society of 
Uzbekistan (IHRSU), respectively. 
46 Annette Bohr, Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1998).
47 Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Umid World ([online 1 Nov 2006]).
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Islam 
Close to 90 percent of Uzbekistan’s population is Sunni Muslim.48 
The Soviet authorities had actively repressed the religion beginning 
in the 1920s by closing down mosques, banning ceremonies, and 
forbidding women to wear veils or children to read the Koran.49 In 
the 1960s, however, Moscow tried a new approach – establishing 
a government-sanctioned version of Islam with state-approved 
re li gious schools (madrassahs) and leaders (mullahs) that ran 
state-approved mosques. An ‘unoffi cial’ Islam still existed in 
tan dem with the offi cial version, and underground madrassahs 
and mosques existed throughout the country. This system of 
government-sanctioned Islam continued after Uzbekistan’s inde-
pendence, but the people remained mistrustful of it and the real 
popular support lay with the underground version. Outward ex-
pressions of religious faith were restricted to offi cial Islam, and 
any political expression of the religion was banned. According to 
Rashid, this allowed Islamic radicals to more easily gain followers 
in Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia.50
The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), founded in Astrakhan, 
Russia in 1990 and headquartered in Moscow, originally sought 
to unify Muslims throughout the Soviet Union.51 Denouncing 
the ‘offi cial’ clergy, the IRP platform emphasized preaching, con-
version, the creation of Islamic schools, and supported the im-
plementation of Islamic social justice.52 The party’s local chapter, 
the IRP of Uzbekistan, harbored strong nationalistic tendencies in 
addition to this social justice platform promoted by the broader 
IRP.53 The Karimov regime responded immediately by banning all 
political parties that were religiously inspired. The IRP, which had 
attracted a following in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, gradually 
lost its momentum after operating illegally for a time. The 1992 
48 International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan at Ten.
49 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002).
50 Ibid.
51 Oliver Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000). 
52 Ibid.
53 Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the United States.
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disappearance of its founder, Abdullah Utaev, was believed to be 
the work of the Uzbek secret police.54 With mainstream opposition 
parties Erk and Birlik (both of which had Islamic components in 
their political platforms) banned along with the IRP of Uzbekistan, 
the stage was now set for the emergence of more radical Islamic 
movements. 
One such group, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation 
Party), is an international movement seeking to establish an Is-
lamic state across Central Asia and eventually the entire Muslim 
world.55 The movement does not advocate violence and as Rashid 
reports, Hizb ut-Tahrir “believes in winning over mass support, 
believing that one day these supporters will rise up in peaceful 
demonstrations and overthrow the regimes of Central Asia”.56 It 
is a secretive group with a closed organizational structure, making 
it diffi cult to gauge its exact size and infl uence. The organization 
uses leafl ets to communicate and promote its message – possession 
of such leafl ets has led to imprisonment by the Uzbek authorities. 
Economics
Uzbekistan has great potential as an economic engine for the region, 
but other factors work against the country’s economic success. 
Due to the Soviet legacy of a cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan, it 
is the second largest cotton exporter in the world. Conditions for 
farmers and other agricultural laborers are dismal, with heavy-
handed enforcement of production quotas and the widespread use 
of conscripted child labor during harvesting.57 Pursuing this type of 
agriculture in Uzbekistan’s arid climate requires massive irrigation 
– water that once fl owed into the Aral Sea. As a result, the water 
level in the lake has dropped dramatically and left formerly coastal 
fi shing villages tens of kilometers from the water’s edge.58 The dry 
alkaline soil is picked up by the wind, creating choking clouds of 
54 Rashid, Jihad.
55 Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the United States and Rashid, Jihad.
56 Rashid, Jihad, p. 117.
57 Environmental Justice Foundation, White Gold, The True Cost of Cotton: 
Uzbekistan, Cotton, and the Crushing of a Nation (London, 2005) (EJF [online 6 
Nov 2006]).
58 Ibid.
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salty dust, and huge environmental concerns. Along with sizable 
natural resources including natural gas, gold deposits and ferrous 
metals, the Uzbek economy has the advantage of location; many 
trade routes pass through Uzbek territory making it an important 
economic actor in the region. Regardless, there are few economic 
winners as much of the profi t-generating industries are state-owned 
and corruption is rampant.59 A large shadow economy sucks reve-
nue away from other enterprises trying to remain ‘legitimate’. As 
one banker told an ICG interviewer, the black market “enriched 
a very limited group of people and [is] ruining the businesses of 
many promising entrepreneurs who struggle to survive this unfair 
economic battle.”60
Corruption is a part of everyday life in Uzbekistan prevalent in 
all types of social situations. Bribes are expected by public servants 
to expedite services; university admissions and grades are also de-
pendent on payments to university offi cials.61 A patronage system 
encourages corruption and limits the employment opportunities of 
those without a family member or friend in a position of infl uence. 
This ‘institutionalization’ of corruption helps the regime maintain 
control. Almost anyone is vulnerable to anti-corruption laws that 
are applied in a highly selective manner in order to punish those 
disloyal to the regime or industrious enough to start up a business 
that competes directly with those owned by the oligarchy.62 The 
oligarchy, consisting of powerful politicians along with their fami-
lies and supporters, controls almost all means of production in 
Uzbekistan. Very few economic activities apart from small-scale 
bazaar trading are open to average Uzbek citizens, and the larger 
enterprises, from cotton production to mining, are controlled by a 
small group of elites.63
59 International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan at Ten.
60 Ibid, p. 22.
61 Freedom House: Nations In Transit 1998: Uzbekistan (Budapest: Freedom House, 
1999) (United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and Finance 
[online 12 Jan 2006]).
62 Interviews conducted by the author in Tashkent, February/March 2006.
63 Interviews conducted by the author in Tashkent, February/March 2006.
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Human rights
The human rights situation is deplorable. Through nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) as well as the US State Department 
annual country reports, a constant barrage of abuses has been 
chronicled. The government enjoys complete control over the 
coun try’s media outlets by way of direct censorship through such 
legislation as the 1991 prohibition against “offending the honor 
or dignity of the president”.64 Indirect and unoffi cial censorship 
methods are also widely employed, as illustrated by the many well-
documented cases of journalist intimidation, arrest, torture, and 
imprisonment resulting from criticism of the government.65
Police use questionable methods during arrest procedures and 
often plant evidence. Political opposition fi gures are particularly 
prone to such treatment. As the 1993 Human Rights Watch Report 
documents: 
On May 5, the co-chairman of the Birlik Popular Movement, 
Shukhrat Ismatullaev, was beaten on the street by unidentifi ed 
assailants and spent six weeks in the intensive care unit in Tashkent 
suffering from head injuries. That attack mirrored almost exactly 
the attack on his counterpart in Birlik, co-chairman Abdurakhim 
Pulatov, in June of 1992. On October 4, Samad Murad was beaten 
in Karshi within days of his election as Erk’s general secretary.66 
Torture by Uzbek authorities is widespread and frequent, and these 
methods are used to elicit confessions that are then admissible in 
court. Trials are neither open nor fair. The State Department esti-
ma ted in 1994 that up to 40 political prisoners were being held 
for purported “antigovernment activities [such as] distributing 
news papers of the opposition Erk party”.67 While both Human 
Rights Watch and the State Department saw slight improvements 
in 1995, the overall situation in Uzbekistan remained grim after 
four years of independence. President Karimov employed harsh 
64 United States Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 
1993 (US Government [online 1 Nov 2006]).
65 United States Department of State, Country Report…1993, and Human Rights 
Watch, World Report 1995: Uzbekistan (HRW, 1996 [online 1 Nov 2006]).
66 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1993: Uzbekistan (HRW, 1994 [online 1 Nov 
2006]).
67 United States Department of State, Country Report…1993.
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measures in order to solidify his control and continued these prac-
tices to ensure his hold on power.
Regional issues
Between 1924 and 1936, Central Asia was divided into fi ve 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the borders drawn in a fashion many 
describe as “arbitrary inventions of Soviet planners”.68 It was 
never intended for these republics to be independent entities and 
therefore utilities, irrigation, and transportation networks pay little 
attention to the current national boundaries. This has resulted in 
continuous and complex confl icts in the region over border issues 
and natural resources.69 For example, Uzbekistan depends on water 
fl owing down from Kyrgyz sources for their cotton crops while 
Kyrgyzstan relies on gas imports from Uzbekistan. A frustrated 
Uzbek government, tired of non-payment for the gas shipments to 
its impoverished Kyrgyz neighbors, regularly halts these shipments 
in the winter, causing Kyrgyzstan to increase the fl ow of water 
through their hydroelectric plants to make up for the lost energy 
production. Less water is then available in Kyrgyz reservoirs for 
Uzbek crops in the spring and summer, further escalating tensions 
between these countries.70
A civil war raged in neighboring Tajikistan from 1992–1997, 
and Uzbekistan joined Russia in supporting a Tajik government 
made up of former communists against a coalition of pro-
democracy groups and the IRP in Tajikistan.71 The Taliban in 
Afghanistan were also perceived as a threat to Uzbekistan, due 
to a sizeable Uzbek enclave in Afghanistan, the aggressive nature 
of the Taliban regime, and reported comments by some Taliban 
leaders hinting at ambitions of gaining control over the ancient 
Muslim cities of Samarkand and Bukhara in Uzbekistan.72 These 
issues combined to create a rather unstable political atmosphere 
in Central Asia during this period. This was the situation facing 
68 Nick Megoran, “The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana 
Valley Boundary Dispute 1999–2000”, Political Geography, vol. 23 (2004): 733.
69 Ibid.
70 Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia”.
71 Rashid, Jihad.
72 Ibid.
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the United States in 1995 as the US government debated foreign 
policy issues relating to Uzbekistan.
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Chapter 3
Growing US interest in 
Central Asia 1995–97 
Making Eurasia stable
The Clinton administration in its fi rst term (1993–96) appeared 
to show little public interest in Uzbekistan or in Central Asia as 
a whole. American policies addressed collectively the states of 
the former Soviet Union in broad economic and humanitarian 
aid packages aimed at stabilizing the new republics and securing 
loose Soviet nuclear weaponry. The main conduit of this aid was 
the Freedom Support Act, proposed by President George H.W. 
Bush in 1992 and approved by Congress the same year, which 
authorized substantial American foreign aid to Russia and the 
other former Soviet republics.73 This legislation created assistance 
programs and allocated funding to address American concerns of 
regional instability and nuclear proliferation, while at the same 
time increasing American infl uence in a part of the world that had 
previously been fi rmly within the Soviet sphere. One exception 
to this broad regional approach was a 1995 visit to Tashkent by 
Secretary of Defense William Perry, where he singled out Uzbekistan 
as “an island of stability in Central Asia”.74
73 Curt Tarnoff, “US Assistance to the Former Soviet Union 1991–2001: A history of 
Administrative and Congressional Action”, CRS Report for Congress (Washington 
DC: CRS, 2002) (Federation of American Scientists [online 6 Nov 2006]).
74 Quoted in S. Fredrick Starr, “Making Eurasia Stable” Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 
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Some prominent writers and academics also began advocating 
a bilateral approach to the region. A 1996 article in the infl uential 
journal Foreign Affairs by S. Frederick Starr drew attention to 
Central Asia and Uzbekistan in particular. Starr saw three possible 
outcomes for the region: a return of Moscow’s infl uence, a lapse in-
to the sort of chaos seen in Tajikistan and Afghanistan at that time, 
or attainment of a strategic equilibrium through the “emergence 
of an anchor state or states”.75 After discounting the other four 
states in the region as unlikely candidates (Kazakhstan’s closeness 
to Russia, Kyrgyzstan’s poor resources and ethnic tensions, Tajiki-
stan’s internal strife, Turkmenistan’s small population and large 
expanses of desert terrain), Starr outlined the advantages of deve-
loping Uzbekistan into this role as an anchor state. 
Although the country had some liabilities, including an over-
reliance on cotton exports and Soviet-designed borders with its 
neighbors that led to confl icts, Uzbekistan’s geographic and demo-
graphic size placed it at the top of the list of candidates. The country’s 
geographic location in the heart of Central Asia was an advantage, 
and while “it borders all the region’s other states, it alone has no 
common border with any major power.”76 Starr acknowledged the 
human rights abuses of the Karimov regime, but maintained that 
the Uzbek government was “acting in accordance with an overall 
strategy of change” which involved securing Uzbekistan’s political 
stability before introducing democratic reforms and free market 
development.77 The overriding theme of the article advocated in-
creasing US support for Uzbekistan in the expectation that such 
support would generate greater regional stability and the hope that 
engagement would help the country along on the path to political, 
economic, and social reforms.
The argument that Central Asian stability depended on a strong 
and US-supported Uzbekistan was to have a signifi cant impact on 
the thinking of US policymakers. A book published the following 





SECURITY OR HUMAN RIGHTS?   35
ad vo cated a similar strategy.78 Scholars like Starr and Brzezinski 
sup ported an increase in American support for Uzbekistan and 
tended to accept or overlook the authoritarian nature of the Uzbek 
government and its record of human rights abuses, believing that 
the regime would eventually institute reforms, but at its own pace.79 
Both academics were associated with the newly formed School 
of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 
headed up by Paul Wolfowitz, a former diplomat during the 
Reagan years and Under Secretary of Defense for policy under 
President George H.W. Bush.
The 1996 Karimov visit
President Karimov’s 1996 meeting with President Clinton, referred 
to by the White House as a ‘working visit’, came after a multi-
year charm offensive by the Uzbek leader to attract US support. 
Uzbekistan took the American position consistently at the United 
Nations in the years leading up to the 1996 visit, voiced support for 
Israel in order to show solidarity with the US, backed a US trade 
embargo on Iran, joined the NATO-organized Partnership for 
Peace program, and participated in military exercises alongside US 
troops in 1995.80 Since gaining independence from the dissolving 
Soviet Union in 1991, Uzbekistan had consistently sought to 
distance itself from Moscow. At the same time, the Karimov 
regime saw for itself a greater role in Central Asia as a regional 
hegemon.81 Another patron than Russia was required in order to 
achieve this status, and the United States was the logical choice.
Despite Tashkent’s friendly overtures, the lack of enthusiasm 
displayed by the Clinton administration in its dealings with 
78 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its 
Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
79 Karimov claimed this to be the case in several public statements, pointing to 
Uzbekistan’s short history as an independent country compared with two centuries 
of democracy experience in the United States. He assured the international 
community that Uzbekistan was on the path of reform. (see Akbarzadeh, 
Uzbekistan and the United States).
80 Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the United States.
81 Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia”.
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Uzbekistan was due in large part to the dismal human rights record 
of the Karimov regime. Human Rights Watch in 1995 observed 
that 
the US continued to be the only country known to have kept human 
rights high on its bilateral agenda with Uzbekistan. The Clinton 
administration actively monitored human rights conditions, issued 
demarches and conducted interventions even as it welcomed 
the government’s increased willingness to address human rights 
concerns.82 
During a US trip in 1995, Karimov met with Vice President Al 
Gore, but was denied a meeting with President Clinton due to the 
Uzbek government’s abuses. 
A year later, Clinton initially refused to meet the Uzbek lea-
der even after the details of the US visit had been arranged, in 
or der to distance the administration from Karimov and show con-
tinued disapproval for the human rights abuses of the Uzbek gov-
ernment.83 Clinton apparently agreed to a brief meeting only after 
an announcement by the Uzbek government in early June that 
some 80 political prisoners would be granted presidential pardons 
(in fact, the release of only fi ve prisoners could be confi rmed).84 
A short statement released by the White House reported that the 
“two presidents addressed key political, economic, and security 
is sues of mutual interest, including progress in political and eco-
nomic reform”.85 After his White House visit, Karimov made his 
fi rst visit to the Pentagon where he met with Secretary of Defense 
Wil liam Perry. The Defense Department memo noted that the visit 
ex emplifi ed “the growing signifi cance of the US-Uzbek bi lateral 
82 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1995: Uzbekistan (HRW, 1996 [online 1 Nov 
2006]).
83 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1995; Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the United 
States; Implementation of US Policy on Caspian Sea Oil Exports, hearing before the 
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion of 
the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 8 July 1998, Federal News 
Service ([online 2 Nov 2006]).
84 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 26 August 1996, Human Rights Watch, World 
Report 1996: Uzbekistan (HRW, 1997 [online 1 Nov 2006]).
85 “Statement by the Press Secretary: Clinton – Karimov Meeting”, White House Press 
Release, 25 June 1996, collection of White House Papers, Ibiblio Digital Library 
(Center for Public Domain [online 2 Nov 2006]).
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and multilateral security partnership”.86 Karimov then spent se-
veral weeks in the US, meeting with American business leaders 
and securing new contracts that increased substantially American 
foreign investment in Uzbekistan.87
The following year, US-Uzbek trade rose from $50 million to 
$420 million with large investments by US mining companies.88 
Foreign direct investment reached an all-time high of $167 million 
in 1997.89 The US Export-Import Bank, an agency under the exe-
cutive branch, provided loan guarantees of $55 million in 1995, 
$80 million in 1996, with levels jumping to $301 million in 1997.90 
Direct US foreign assistance to Uzbekistan nearly doubled from 
$11 million in 1995 to $21 million in 1996, before returning to 
$16.9 million in 1997, the bulk of which funded economic and 
social programs and included on average $1.7 million for citizen 
participation programs and NGO support.91
Military assistance in the form of International Military Edu-
cation and Training (IMET) began in 1995 and remained low 
(under $1 million). Along with several other former Soviet coun-
tries, Uzbekistan fi rst became eligible for Foreign Military Fi nan-
cing (FMF) under NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 
1997.92 Referring to congressionally appropriated grants given to 
for eign governments to fi nance the purchase of American-made 
86 United States Department of Defense, “Memorandum for Correspondents”, no. 
144-M, 26 June 1996, DefenseLink ([online 5 Dec 2005]). 
87 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996.
88 Rashid, Jihad.
89 Freedom House: Nations In Transit 1999–2000: Uzbekistan (Budapest: Freedom 
House, 2001) (United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and 
Finance [online 2 Nov 2006]).
90 United States Department of State, US Government Assistance to and Cooperative 
Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union: 1996, and 
United States Department of State, US Government Assistance… Former Soviet 
Union: 1997, both Offi ce of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS, Foreign 
Policy Institute Resource Library ([online 1 Nov 2006]).
91 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Congressional 
Presentation: 1997 and Congressional Presentation: 1998, both from (USAID 
[online 2 Nov 2006]). The US provides foreign assistance, arranges credit 
guarantees from the US Export-Import Bank, and ships privately donated 
humanitarian aid. The fi gures cited in the text always refer to US assistance 
excluding the humanitarian aid and ExIm loans. See table on the following page.
92 United States Department of State, US Government Assistance… Former Soviet 
Union: 1997, Foreign Policy Institute Resource Library ([online 1 Nov 2006]).
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wea pons, services and training, Uzbekistan received an initialgrant 
of $1 million through this program.93 
Interest in Central Asia increases
There were other signs of a heightened interest in Central Asia 
as well. First Lady Hillary Clinton traveled through the region in 
1997, visiting Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. She used 
93 Victoria Garcia and Rachel Stohl, “Arms Trade: Uzbekistan”, 1 July 2003, Center 
for Defense Information [online 7 Jan 2006].
Overview of US assistance to Uzbekistan 1995–2005 












1995 11.3 0.1 1.6 2.7 55.0
1996 21.0 0.3 1.6 9.0 80.0
1997 16.9 1.2 1.7 22.7 301.0
1998 26.5 1.0 5.0 4.5 379.0
1999 46.2 10.0 3.3 29.0 256.0
2000 36.9 11.5 2.5 27.5 30.5
2001 59.6 11.8 2.9 25.4 136.0
2002 221.8 71.0 8.4 78.2 70.0
2003 94.2 37.7 5.2 42.0 96.0
2004 84.6 39.1 9.2 16.4 0.0
2005 101.6 63.3 9.3 20.0 81.0
A Humanitarian assistance and US Export Import bank credit guarantees not included 
as part of US assistance totals.
B Security assistance includes FMF, IMET, EXBS (border security), law enforcement, 
and non-proliferation/CTR funding. Some aid from 2004 and 2005 (mostly FMF 
and IMET) was not dispensed due to State Department decertifi cation. Amounts 
ranged from $8 million in 2004 to $24 million in 2005, though the total amounts 
budgeted are shown here.
 Sources: State Department, US Government Assistance to Eurasia reports, State 
Department fact sheets, HRW World Reports, Meppen (2006), Garcia and Stohl 
(2003), US Export-Import Bank site. No single source provides a complete overview 
of aid due to extra-budgetary payments and assistance from a variety of sources 
within the US government, less detailed reporting prior to 2001. These fi gures are 
the best estimates of the author and any errors are most likely from underestimating 
funds.
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her time in Uzbekistan to visit nongovernmental organizations 
and delivered a speech on the importance of democracy and free 
markets.94 Uzbekistan participated in annual (since 1995) NATO 
training exercises in conjunction with the Central Asia Battalion 
(Centrasbat), a joint military unit with forces from Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.95 For the 1997 exercise, 500 troops 
from Fort Bragg, North Carolina were airlifted nonstop and 
inserted by parachute 19 hours later into the exercise zone located 
in Kazakhstan – the longest airborne operation in history.96 
General John Sheehan, commanding offi cer and the fi rst to jump, 
told journalists upon landing: “The message is that there is no 
nation on the face of the earth that we cannot get to.”97 
Also that year, Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott gave 
a key speech on US policy towards Central Asia at the newly 
established School of Advanced International Studies at Johns 
Hopkins University. Talbott warned against a return to a ‘Great 
Game’ scenario, saying such a confl ict was “very much of the 
zero-sum variety. What we want to help bring about is just the 
opposite: We want to see all responsible players in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia be winners.”98 Talbott stressed that regional 
integration would provide lasting stability to Central Asia, while a 
traditional power-balancing situation might lead to more confl ict. 
America’s support for the region aimed to bring about democracy, 
free market economies, regional cooperation, and integration with 
the international community.99
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings 
on American foreign policy in Central Asia in July 1997. The 
94 Embassy of the United States, Tashkent, Uzbekistan (USINFO [online 9 Jan 2006]). 
95 Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the United States.
96 Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (New York: 
Grove/Atlantic Inc, 2003); David Brindly, “Asia’s Big Oil Rush: Count Us in”, US 
News and World Report, 29 September 1997 ([online 1 Nov 2006]).
97 Brindly, “Asia’s Big Oil Rush”.
98 Strobe Talbott, “A Farewell to Flashman: American policy in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia”, speech at Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., 21 July 1997, 
Caspian Sea Library (The Council on Foreign Relations [online 2 Nov 2005]). 
The ‘Great Game’ refers to the 19th century geopolitical battle over Central Asia 
between Great Britain and Czarist Russia, immortalized in Rudyard Kipling’s novel 
Kim.
99 Ibid.
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Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, Stuart Eizenstat, 
testifi ed for the administration and stated that 
[I]n recognition of the growing strategic importance of the area 
to the United States, the Clinton administration, earlier this year, 
made a policy decision to further enhance our already considerable 
engagement with the eight states of the Caucasus and Central 
Asian region.”100 
Eizenstat listed fi ve US interests in the region: economic and political 
reform in the Central Asian countries, their integration into regional 
and international institutions, “rapid” development of Caspian 
energy resources with “robust US commercial participation”, 
confl ict resolution in the region, and strong sovereign states to 
ward off Russian and Iranian infl uence.101 Discussions concerning 
Iran and Russia led Senator Diane Feinstein to ask whether the 
administration saw “a kind of race to secure infl uence and control 
in this region of the world”.102 Eizenstat replied that Central Asia 
was “clearly an area where a whole host of countries are trying 
to gain infl uence”, and that the US should create “the political 
and economic infrastructure so that our companies get the fair 
opportunity to compete for the enormous energy resources” 
while also striving “politically to assure the independence of these 
countries” from Iran and Russia.103
Another witness that day, Lt. General William Odom of the 
Washington-based think tank The Hudson Institute, characterized 
Uzbekistan as the “heavyweight” in Central Asia and as having 
“very great strategic signifi cance”.104 These types of statements, 
combined with viewpoints similar to the Starr article which sup-
ported the development of Uzbekistan as an ‘anchor state’, may 
have led policymakers to begin to assume that an increased US 
presence in Central Asia was best achieved through an increased 
engagement with Uzbekistan. This reasoning had yet to be heard 
from the administration, however, whose focus continued to be at 
100 Policy towards Caucasus and Central Asia, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
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the regional level. The United States’ relationship with Uzbekistan 
remained lukewarm.
For its part, the Karimov regime seemed to be making small 
steps toward progress in 1996, partly to improve its image prior 
to the US visit. The US State Department annual report on human 
rights practices in Uzbekistan noted that the government took 
“several steps toward creating a less authoritarian society”, but 
acknowledged that “serious problems remain”.105 The organization 
Human Rights Watch praised the United States in its annual 
report, calling it the “major source of pressure on the Uzbek 
government” to improve its record.106 Human rights monitoring 
improved with the government permitting some NGOs to open 
offi ces in the country, including Human Rights Watch/Helsinki 
and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.107 The annual survey by 
Freedom House improved Uzbekistan’s ‘civil liberties’ rating 
from a seven (the worst) to a score of six, though the country’s 
‘political freedom’ continued to receive a seven rating.108 Many of 
the improvements were cosmetic in nature and probably intended 
for international consumption rather than signifying real changes 
in the country. It appeared that Karimov clearly understood the 
international community’s expectations of reform, and realized 
that such promises were necessary even if he had no intention of 
keeping them. 
Summary: The bilateral relationship emerges 
Karimov’s visit to the White House in 1996 had little practical 
value in terms of signed agreements or promises by the United 
States to increase its support of the Uzbek regime: the value of 
the meeting was purely symbolic in nature. The appearance of the 
two presidents together gave the Uzbek leader an unstated nod of 
approval and sent the message that this relationship was important 
to the United States. That Clinton was so hesitant to grant a meeting 
105 United States Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 
1996 (US Government [online 1 Nov 2006]).
106 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996.
107 United States Department of State, Annual Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices for 1997 (US Government [online 1 Nov 2006]).
108 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 1998.
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while Karimov was so eager to obtain one illustrates the powerful 
symbolism involved; the substance of the meeting was relatively 
inconsequential. Although the Clinton administration might not 
have been prepared to back one of the Central Asian nations at the 
expense of the others, it is clear there was a heightened awareness 
of the region in the United States. Infl uential scholars began to ad-
vocate increased US support for Uzbekistan, a country seen as the 
key to Central Asia.
The Clinton administration listed democracy promotion as one 
of its core national security objectives, after diplomacy backed 
by military force and securing economic prosperity.109 Talbott’s 
1997 speech was consistent with this, in that regional stability, co-
operation, and diplomacy would lead to solutions (namely energy 
exports) that could benefi t all actors involved. The National 
Security Strategy struck a similar note: peace and security through 
democracy and economic development. The message combined 
normative ideals with instrumental logic: “This commitment to see 
freedom and respect for human rights take hold is not only just, 
but pragmatic, for strengthened democratic institutions benefi t the 
US and the world”.110 Clinton’s 1994 State of the Union Address 
made this point clearly: “Democracies don’t attack each other. 
They make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy. That 
is why we have supported, you and I, the democratic reformers 
in Russia and in the other states of the former Soviet bloc”.111 
President Clinton made democracy promotion a central part of his 
foreign policy, though it was “democracy American style, linking 
free markets to the political freedoms characteristic of the American 
form of government”.112 As in the other new independent states 
(NIS), American interests in Uzbekistan would be the promotion 
of democracy and economic development – and these interests 
were refl ected in US policy. The diffi culty lay in deciding exactly 
109 “The National Security Strategy of the United States”, May 1997, The White House 
(GlobalSecurity.org [online 2 Nov 2005]).
110 Ibid.
111 “1994 State of the Union Address”, 25 January 1994, Washington Post ([online 6 
Nov 2006]).
112 Julie Mertus, Bait and Switch: Human Rights and US Foreign Policy (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), p. 40.
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how the promotion of these ideals was best accomplished in 
Uzbekistan: through limited engagement and criticism or though 
a more active relationship with Tashkent.
The contrasting positions of the White House and the Pentagon 
with regard to Uzbekistan were refl ected in Karimov’s 1996 visit. 
Clinton’s reluctant meeting with the Uzbek president was followed 
by a carefully worded press release. Over at the Pentagon, Secretary 
Perry had praised Uzbekistan in his 1995 Tashkent visit and high-
lighted the increased importance of US-Uzbek cooperation during 
Karimov’s 1996 Pentagon visit. Diverging approaches in US 
policymaking circles were to become even more apparent in the 
coming years as the US-Uzbek relationship evolved. Two distinct 
approaches became clear during this fi rst phase of closer US-Uzbek 
relations. The realists in Washington focused on regional stability, 
access to energy resources, and balance of power issues grounded 
in a zero-sum game attitude towards geopolitics in Central Asia. 
The liberalists tended to focus on political and economic reform 
within each country, in the belief that more open and plurali stic 
governments in the region would ultimately lead to greater regio-
nal stability and stronger independent republics able to resist the 
infl uence of Moscow or Beijing. US policy goals during this period 
were broadly focused on regional stability, commercial interests, 
and non-proliferation efforts. An even distribution of foreign 
as si stance allocated to the Central Asian states refl ected these 
priorities, where Uzbekistan was simply one of eight countries in 
the Central Asia/Caucasus region receiving US support. 
The force projection demonstration inherent in the 1997 training 
exercises sent a clear message to Moscow that the US was able to 
operate militarily in the geographically distant region of Central 
Asia; it was, in effect, an act of geopolitical gamesmanship. Another 
small yet revealing action taken by the US at this time was the 
granting of FMF assistance to Uzbekistan in 1997. Although all 
US aid is subject to human rights conditions, security aid is given 
extra attention in US legislation. With the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) non-proliferation funds and other military as-
sis tance, the State Department must certify that international 
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human rights standards are not being violated. Non-certifi cation 
bars the distribution of funding to the country in violation, unless 
the president waives the restrictions by citing overriding national 
security interests.113 Although Uzbekistan was just one of several 
newly independent states (NIS) to receive this type of military aid, 
it points toward an acceptance of the Karimov regime’s abuses. At 
this point it seemed that the United States had yet to see any urgent 
na tional interest in Uzbekistan requiring an extra investment of 
money or political capital in the country, but this was beginning 
to change.
113 22 U.S.C. sec. 2304 (1998).
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Chapter 4
An increased focus on 
miltant Islam 1998–2000
Terrorist attacks and Islamic violence
In August 1998, simultaneous bomb attacks struck the American 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 
258 people and wounding over 5000 others. An investigation by 
American authorities concluded that the terrorist organization 
al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden had planned and 
carried out the attacks. Intelligence sources located bin Laden’s 
mountain hideout in Afghanistan and President Clinton ordered 
military strikes in an attempt to destroy it and bin Laden’s 
terrorist network. In addition, the president authorized the CIA to 
conduct covert operations intended to “disrupt and pre-empt bin 
Laden’s operations”.114 As a result, a partnership of “signifi cant” 
intelligence and military cooperation began between Washington 
and Tashkent around this time.115 The increased US focus on 
radical Islam meshed perfectly with the rising concern of the 
Karimov regime.
The Karimov regime felt increasingly threatened by radical 
Is la mic groups during this period. The civil war in neighboring 
Tajikistan had recently ended in a power-sharing arrangement 
114 Thomas E. Ricks and Susan B. Glasser, ”US Operated Secret Alliance with 
Uzbekistan”, Washington Post, 14 October 2001.
115 Ibid.
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between former communist leaders and a coalition made up of 
democratic and Islamic groups. The fundamentalist government 
across the border in Afghanistan represented yet another Islamic 
threat to the Uzbek government for which Karimov hoped to fi nd 
external support in combating. With the main domestic opposition 
parties Erk and Birlik banned, the stage was set for more radical 
movements infi ltrating from outside the country, including Hizb 
ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
Hizb ut-Tahrir, as mentioned earlier, purports to advocate a 
non-violent strategy for revolution, though there is good reason 
to doubt this commitment to the peaceful establishment of a cali-
phate.116 The IMU was founded by Tahir Yuldeshev and Juma 
Namangani, with Yuldashev as its political leader and Namangani 
as its military commander.117 Beginning in the mid-1990s, 
Yuldeshev had encouraged inhabitants of the Fergana Valley town 
of Namangan to follow Islamic teachings more strictly and steadi-
ly gained a following of disillusioned Islamic Renaissance Party 
(IRP) members including Namangani, who had fought in the 
Afghan confl ict with the Soviet army.118 
In December 1997, four Uzbek policemen were killed in 
Namangan by individuals the government claimed were radical 
Wahhabi Muslims, but who local Muslim leaders claimed were 
simply ordinary criminals.119 According to a report by the Inter-
national Crisis Group, “police detained hundreds of people because 
they wore religious clothes, had beards or prayed in a manner that 
identifi ed them as members of ‘suspicious’ groups”, and according 
to one witness “the authorities had a list of those thought to be ‘too 
religious’ and a new wider campaign of arrests began”.120 A group 
116 Kurt Meppen, “US-Uzbek Bilateral Relations”, pp. 13–43.
117 Juma Namangani’s real name was Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovich Khojaev, but 
incorporated the name of his hometown of Namangan as a pseudonym.
118 Rashid, Jihad.
119 Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Political Reform and Human 
Rights in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakstan, Congress no. 105, session no. 1, 
January 1998 (CSCE, 1 March 1998 [online 21 Apr 2006]).
120 International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan at Ten, p.18. The government referred to 
the perpetrators as “Wahhabis”, a more fundamentalist version of Sunni Islam 
promoted by the government of Saudi Arabia. According to Rashid, Jihad, p. 46, 
“By 1997, the government was labelling as Wahhabis even ordinary Muslims who 
practiced Islam in unoffi cial mosques or engaged in private prayer or study”.
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of Muslims arrested in Andijan in connection with the killings 
admitted receiving training from Namangani and the IMU.121 In 
an infamous speech before parliament a few months later in May 
1998, President Karimov expressed this view of radical Muslims: 
“These people should be shot in the head. If necessary, I’ll shoot 
them myself”.122 Thus began a widespread campaign of arrests 
by the Karimov regime targeting Muslims, and thousands were 
arbitrarily arrested. Reports surfaced detailing allegations that the 
authorities threatened to rape defendants’ family members unless 
they cooperated and fathers were imprisoned and punished due to 
charges against their sons.123
Six car bombs detonated in Tashkent in February 1999 in an 
apparent assassination attempt on Karimov that left 13 dead 
and injured 120 others, according to government sources.124 The 
government blamed both the Erk Party and Islamic militants 
of the attack, and several thousand people were subsequently 
arrested.125 Eventually, Erk founder Muhammad Salih was accused 
of planning the attack in cooperation with the IMU and was con-
victed in absentia (without substantial evidence) to a fi fteen-year 
prison term.126 In August 1999, a group of IMU militants under 
Namangani entered a Kyrgyz section of the Fergana Valley from 
their mountain base in Tajikistan, taking hostages and attracting 
international attention.127 The Kyrgyz army went into action 
a gainst the IMU and fi ghting continued for several months. Sus-
tained engagements between IMU militants and the Kyrgyz 
military failed to resolve matters, and the IMU only withdrew in 
late October because the onset of the winter snows would hinder 
their escape through the mountain passes back to their bases in 
neighboring Tajikistan.128 The IMU returned to the Fergana Valley 
121 Rashid, Jihad.
122 Daniel Williams,“ Uzbeks Caught Between Secular, Islamic Currents”, Washington 
Post, 27 September 1998.
123 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999: Uzbekistan (HRW, 2000 [online 1 Nov 
2006]).
124 Daniel Williams, “13 Die in Uzbek Bombings“, Washington Post, 17 February 
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125 Rashid, Jihad.
126 International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan at Ten.
127 Rashid, Jihad.
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in the summer of 2000, with several hundred well-armed guerrillas 
attacking Kyrgyz and Uzbek forces in numerous locations over the 
next few months.129 These attacks, along with the other acts of 
violence attributed to Islamic extremists, put the Karimov regime 
on the defensive. Tashkent, clearly feeling threatened by radical 
Islam, looked toward the US for assistance.
US response to radical Islam in Central Asia
After the embassy attacks, the United States was suddenly willing 
to listen to Uzbek concerns about Islamic terrorists. In the offi cial 
statement announcing the retaliatory missile attacks, Clinton ref-
lected on the magnitude of a concerted national counterterrorism 
effort, saying, “This will be a long, ongoing struggle between 
freedom and fanaticism; between the rule of law and terrorism. We 
must be prepared to do all that we can for as long as we must”.130 
Central Asia appeared to be the next fl ashpoint for radical Islam 
and US policymakers refocused their attention on the region and 
on Uzbekistan. 
Discussions in the United States Congress dealt with a range of 
issues including energy extraction, Islam, and regional stability. 
Democracy and political reform were touched on broadly and 
with little mention of human rights concerns. A February 1998 
House hearing entitled “US interests in Central Asia” devoted the 
most attention to energy extraction and the strategic nature of oil 
and gas resources in the region. Congressman Howard Berman 
characterized US interests as “simply to ensure its progressive po-
li tical and economic development and to prevent it from being 
under the thumb of any outside power, be it Iran or Russia”.131 In 
a similar vein, Robert Gee, Assistant Secretary for Policy with the 
US Department of Energy, stated “We have strategic interests in 
supporting the independence, sovereignty, and prosperity of the 
129 Ibid.
130 “Clinton statement in full”, BBC News, 20 August 1998 (BBC [online 1 Nov 
2006]).
131 US Interests in the Central Asian Republics, hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Asia and the Pacifi c of the House Committee on International Relations, 12 
February 1998, Federal News Service ([online 2 Nov 2006]).
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Newly Independent States of the Caspian Basin,” and that the US 
also had an interest in 
maximizing commercial opportunities for US fi rms and for US 
and other foreign investment in the region’s energy development 
(…) Rapid development of the region’s energy resources and trade 
linkages are critical to the independence, prosperity, democracy, 
and stability of all of the countries of that region.132
Another Senate hearing on Caspian energy held just prior to the 
1998 embassy bombings addressed militant groups in Central Asia. 
Academic Dr. Martha Brill Olcott, a regular witness on Capitol 
Hill, testifi ed to the destabilizing nature of militant Islam, saying 
“If Islamic groups should take power in Uzbekistan or even if a 
secular regime should opt for visible religious coloration, there is 
sure to be impact in all three of these neighboring states.”133 She 
went on to observe that “Uzbekistan’s government has created the 
most pervasive and effective security force in the region and is 
clear ly able to deal summarily with small pockets of resistance, but 
is unlikely to be able to deal effectively with mass resistance”.134 
In remarks published afterwards in the Congressional Record, 
Con gressman Christopher Smith acknowledged the strategic 
and commercial interests of the US in pursuing relations with 
Uzbekistan, but expressed concern over the Karimov regime’s 
poor human rights record and urged the US and Karimov to work 
to wards reform.135 
A 1999 Senate hearing entitled “Extremist Movements and their 
threat to the United States” also discussed militant Islam in Central 
Asia. The State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 
Michael A. Sheehan, pointed out the links between the Taliban, 
Osama bin Laden, and militant Islamic groups in Uzbekistan and 
other Central Asian countries. In combating extremist groups, 
Sheehan noted, the “central element of our counterterrorism efforts 
remains a combination of political will and diplomatic action. We 
132 Ibid.
133 Implementation of US Policy on Caspian Sea Oil Exports.
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135 “Human Rights in Uzbekistan”, Christopher Smith, Extension of Remarks, 
Congressional Record, 25 September 1998 (U.S. Government Printing Offi ce 
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can combat terrorism only if we persuade other governments to 
work with us. Intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation 
and armed force are important. But they must be integrated into 
an overall political/diplomatic strategy”.136
Representatives from the US and Uzbekistan signed several 
security-related agreements in May 1999, one on counterterrorism 
and the second establishing a closer working relationship between 
the Pentagon and Uzbekistan’s Defense Ministry.137 Congressional 
hearings in 1998 and 1999 resulted in two pieces of legislation 
re le vant to Uzbekistan: the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 and 
the Security Assistance Act of 1999. The Silk Road Act authorized 
no new funding, but more clearly defi ned how existing funding 
should be directed, listing economic assistance, border control, in-
frastructure development and democracy promotion as its major 
goals.138 The Security Assistance Act authorized the transfer of 
excess Defense Department articles to a number of countries, 
including Uzbekistan.139
US assistance rose from $26 million in 1998 to $46 million in 
1999, before falling to $37 million in 2000. Increases in IMET 
funding and FMF aid for arms purchases doubled to a combined 
$2.2 million in 1999, and funding for law enforcement training 
reached $2 million.140 Although the US cleanup of the biological 
weapons site at Nukus made up $6 million of the $10 million in 
security aid, these amounts constituted a substantial increase from 
previous years.141 Border security assistance through the Export 
Control and Related Border Security program (EXBS) began in 
136 Extremist Movements and their threat to the United States, hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 2 November 1999, Federal News Service 
([online 2 Nov 2006]).
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138 Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 and the Security Assistance Act of 1999, Public Law 
no. 106–113.
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140 Garcia and Stohl, “Arms Trade: Uzbekistan”; United States Department of State, 
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Uzbekistan in 2000, with nearly $2 million in funding.142 USAID 
money earmarked for “citizen participation” (programs designed 
to increase public awareness of political developments in order 
to lay the foundation for democratic participation as well as 
increasing the number of NGOs in the country) had jumped to 
$5 million in 1998, but was then reduced to $3.28 million for 
1999 and cut again the following year to $2 million.143 In addition 
to direct US assistance, $61 million worth of unspecifi ed “US 
Defense Department excess and privately donated humanitarian 
commodities” were provided to the Uzbek government from 1998–
2000.144 US Export-Import Bank loan guarantees for Uzbekistan 
increased to $379 million in 1998, dropped the following year to 
$256 million, and fell to only $30 million in 2000.145
Human Rights Watch proclaimed 1998 a “disastrous year 
for human rights in Uzbekistan”, while in 1999 “human rights 
protections in Uzbekistan deteriorated rapidly and dramatically”.146 
The State Department’s own assessment for 1998, the Annual 
Country Report on Human Rights Practices, was muted by com-
parison, stating: “The Government’s human rights record re-
mained poor, and the Government continued to commit serious 
abuses in several areas”.147 In its report the following year, the 
State Department admitted: “the government’s poor human rights 
record worsened” in 1999.148
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Continued insurgency and elevated US 
cooperation
In the spring of 2000, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
offered some tough criticism of Uzbekistan’s human rights situation 
in a speech at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in 
Tashkent. She warned that “indiscriminate government censorship 
and repression can cause moderate and peaceful opponents of a 
re gime to resort to violence” and cautioned against religious per-
secution.149 After wielding its stick, the administration offered 
Uzbekistan the carrot: $3 million would be made available to 
Uzbekistan for border security as well as counterterrorism and 
counter-narcotics training and equipment.150 The catalyst for this 
extra aid was an incident on the Kazakh-Uzbek border a month ear-
lier when Uzbek border guards intercepted a truck hauling scrap 
metal reportedly containing radioactive material.151 The Uzbeks 
claimed they found lead pipes containing highly radioactive ma-
terial while Kazakh tests showed low levels of radiation, consistent 
with their explanation that the scrap metal originated from a 
uranium mine.152 Regardless of the true facts, the incident sparked 
a renewed interest in non-proliferation activities in the region and 
in Uzbekistan.
During the IMU incursion in the spring of 2000, insurgents 
took foreign tourists hostage as a fundraising venture in order to 
extract ransom payments. In August, a group of IMU militants in 
Kyrgyzstan came across four young American climbers and took 
them hostage. Although the climbers later managed to escape (the 
details of which are in dispute), this minor event contributed to 
the United States declaring the IMU a known terrorist group.153 
According to Rashid, some US diplomats had argued that 
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attempts should be made to press Karimov for human rights 
assurances before such a declaration was made, but the CIA and 
FBI were eager to share intelligence with Uzbekistan (which they 
were legally prevented from doing until the IMU was offi cially a 
terrorist group.154 Such cooperation was especially desirable for 
the US due to intelligence reports claiming Namangani and the 
IMU were receiving substantial funding from bin Laden.155
Karimov easily won the 2000 presidential election with 92 per-
cent of the vote.156 His opponent, Professor Abdulhafi z Jalalov, 
had previously held the position of secretary in Karimov’s PDPU 
party, and admitted after the election that he had actually voted 
for Karimov himself in the interest of “stability, peace, our nation’s 
independence, [and] the development of Uzbekistan”.157 When 
asked why he had run, Jalalov replied “So that democracy would 
win.”158 International observers declared the elections neither free 
nor fair, and the US did not offer election-related assistance for 
the 2000 contest due to Uzbekistan’s “lack of commitment to 
electoral reform or to genuinely competitive elections”.159 After the 
election, Karimov’s term was quickly extended by the legislature 
to 2007.160
By the end of the year, the United States and Uzbekistan had 
es tab lished a solid partnership to combat Osama bin Laden’s ter-
rorist network and the IMU. Programs to enhance Uzbekistan’s 
business environment and economic development featured pro-
mi nently in the US aid package for 2000, and US support for 
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Uzbekistan’s military and law enforcement agencies continued 
to rise. One researcher calculated that US Export-Import Bank 
cre dit guarantees to Uzbekistan from 1995–2000 totaled $980 
million.161 
The State Department, using the exact same phrasing as the 
previous year’s report, characterized the human rights situation in 
Uzbekistan as a poor situation that was becoming worse.162 In a 
September 2000 hearing on the State Department’s Annual Report 
on International Religious Freedom (a report required by 1998 
legislation of the same name) Human Rights Watch researcher 
Acacia Shields testifi ed:
Since late 1997, Uzbek police and security forces have arrested 
thousands of pious Muslims. These arrests are illegal and 
discriminatory; they target people who belong to unregistered 
Islamic groups who practice outside state controlled mosques or 
who possess Islamic literature not generated by the government. 
Police routinely torture and threaten detainees, deny them access 
to medical treatment and legal counsel and often hold them 
incommunicado in basement cells for up to 6 months (…) This 
year’s IRF report recognizes neither the anti-religious nature of this 
repression nor the human rights crisis it has produced. It argues 
that victims are engaged in activity that is primarily political and 
therefore that Uzbekistan cannot be said to be violating the victim’s 
religious freedom. Only sophistry has allowed the administration 
to avoid classifying Uzbekistan as a country of particular concern 
for its gross violations of religious freedom.163
Robert A. Seiple, the US Ambassador-at-Large for International 
Religious Freedom, responded to her charges by pointing out that 
“diplomacy has had some major successes” in Uzbekistan, that 
the Karimov regime was justifi ed in being paranoid about Islamic 
extremists after the 1999 Tashkent bombings, and that this was a 
161 State Department Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 2000, 
hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of 
the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 7 September 
2000, Federal News Service ([online 2 Nov 2006]).
162 United States Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 
2000 (US Government [online 1 Nov 2006]).
163 Acacia Shields, congressional testimony 7 September 2000. Listing Uzbekistan 
as a “country of particular concern” would make it ineligible for certain types of 
assistance.
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human rights issue rather than one of religious freedom.164
Continued concerns over stability in Central Asia led some 
to support strengthening the US-Uzbek relationship in order to 
better control Uzbekistan. Far from being an ‘island of stability’, 
Tashkent’s recent dealings with its neighbors had been turbulent. 
Over the previous three years, Uzbekistan had erected fences and 
mined territory claimed by neighboring Kazakhstan and Kyr gyz-
stan, and repeatedly withheld gas shipments to Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan.165 The bombing of Kyrgyz villages by Uzbek planes in 
response to IMU attacks, as well as a tough line towards Tajikistan 
(where IMU bases were located) made these relationships par ti-
cularly tense.166 Testifying before an April 2000 House Joint hear-
ing, Dr. Martha Brill Olcott urged Congress to continue to invest 
in the US-Uzbek relationship, saying “I think engagement with 
Uzbekistan is really critical because they create a security risk for 
the whole region.”167
Summary: Pragmatism sweeps through 
Washington
The 1998 embassy bombings heightened America’s awareness of 
militant Islam and the threat it posed to US interests. The in ves-
tigation into the source of the attacks pointed to Osama bin Laden 
and Afghanistan, so the geographic importance of neighboring 
Uzbekistan was undeniable. As US Counterterrorism Coordinator 
Michael Sheenan testifi ed, Washington needed other governments 
to collaborate in fi ghting extremists hostile to American interests. 
Karimov had been conducting his own domestic campaign against 
what he perceived to be radical Islam, and saw in the United States 
a natural ally. The Uzbek government was more than receptive 
164 State Department Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 2000.
165 International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Faultlines in the New Security Map, 
Asia Report no. 20, 4 July 2001 (ICG [online 12 Nov 2005]); Megoran, “Critical 
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to the idea of American assistance. Cooperation between the two 
countries clearly increased after 1998, although the extent and 
de tails of this cooperation remain unclear. Regardless, the region 
was viewed as a potential source of new Islamic radicalism and the 
mountainous regions of Central Asia provided perfect safe havens 
for terrorist groups. At the same time, this period saw a marked 
increase in internal pressures to pursue Caspian energy resources. 
Although lacking the substantial petroleum export potential of 
the two Central Asia countries bordering the Caspian, namely 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan’s substantial natural 
gas and mineral resources attracted the attention of American com-
mercial interests. Stability in the region was crucial if American 
corporations were to succeed in Central Asia, and Uzbekistan 
a gain became part of the equation as a potential stabilizing force.
Along with ongoing efforts to combat nuclear proliferation in 
the former Soviet states, energy and Islam defi ned US policy in 
the region. In contrast to the previous period in 1996–97, clear 
strategic interests were recognized by the United States. The human 
rights situation in Uzbekistan continued to deteriorate, especially 
after the Namangan killings and the 1999 Tashkent bombings. 
The State Department country reports continued to chronicle this 
steady increase in government abuse along with NGOs like Hu man 
Rights Watch. The policy dilemma was now clear in Uzbekistan: 
security interests or normative human rights concerns?
Based on the concrete actions made by the US government in 
relation to Uzbekistan, it appears that security concerns began 
to dictate American foreign policy. Three trends in US policy are 
worth noting. First, the amount of assistance provided by the United 
States to Uzbekistan more than doubled from the previous period 
of 1995–97. The amounts earmarked for economic and security 
programs constituted a growing portion of the aid – security 
assistance increased tenfold from 1998 to 1999 – while citizenship 
programs and democracy promotion funding steadily decreased 
after 1998. The trend was clear: less aid for civil society programs 
and more funding for items that directly benefi ted the oligarchy. 
Second, the aid increases occurred during a period of escalating 
abuses by the Uzbek government, a trend clearly seen by NGOs as 
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well as the US State Department. Third, the political maneuvering 
for improvements in Uzbekistan’s human rights record, of the sort 
displayed by President Clinton during Karimov’s 1996 visit, were 
not seen in this period. No apparent efforts were made to gain 
any type of concessions or promises of reform from the Karimov 
regime. The granting of FMF aid to Uzbekistan lends support to 
this interpretation, aid that doubled from 1997 to 2000.168 Rather 
than Karimov desiring American approval and support, it now 
appeared that the US hoped for Uzbek cooperation in their hunt 
for Osama bin Laden. Tashkent’s political leverage had increased.
Although normative concerns were voiced by the administration 
through the State Department and by members of Congress, the 
actions taken by the US government reveal a trend toward in creas-
ed cooperation and support for the Uzbek regime after an increas ed 
awareness and reevaluation of Uzbekistan’s strategic importance. 
Increases in US funding coincided with escalating abuses by the 
Karimov regime and occurred without any repercussions or 
conditions being imposed on the aid packages. The US pursued 
its perceived national interests without any concrete attempts to 
pressure President Karimov to institute reforms. Those in Wash-
ington pushing for a more normative agenda were not left emp-
ty handed, however. Although American foreign assistance was 
increasing, a substantial amount of that aid was designed to im prove 
conditions in the country over the long run. Many of the programs 
funded by the US were designed and intended to create a stable 
environment for investment and economic liberalization, factors 
which liberalists believe further political liberalization. While 
most ly benefi ting the Uzbek oligarchy in control of the country’s 
major commercial interests, economic growth ostensibly provided 
some benefi t to an Uzbek population suffering under economic 
hardship as well. Stability and economic growth are important 
buil ding blocks of a democratic society, and an argument could be 
made that a foundation was being laid for future improvements. 
There were limits to the options available to the United States with 
regard to promoting internal change in Uzbekistan and perhaps a 
strategy of engagement was preferred to one of isolation. In any 
168 Garcia and Stohl, “Arms Trade: Uzbekistan”.
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case, the struggle to maintain a balance between perceived strategic 
interests and normative concerns continued and the US had swung 
more towards a realist approach favoring security interests while 
still maintaining some normative components in its policy. 
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Chapter 5
After the 9/11 Attacks 
2001–2003
Operation Enduring Freedom and the US 
base at Karshi-Khanabad
On the eve of the 2001 attacks, the US-Uzbek relationship 
continued to drift towards increased security cooperation. When, 
on 11 September 2001, two hijacked commercial airlines struck 
the World Trade Centre in New York, another plowed into the 
Pentagon, and a fourth crashed into the Pennsylvania countryside 
apparently before reaching its target, the newly-elected Bush ad mi-
ni stration shifted into high gear on counterterrorism. Afgha nistan 
and its neighbors suddenly became the front lines in the US-led 
war on terror. Addressing a joint session of Congress just nine days 
after the attacks, President Bush informed the American people 
that Osama bin Laden and the terrorist network al Qaeda were 
re sponsible, specifi cally mentioning the IMU as one of bin Laden’s 
allies.169 The US pursued bin Laden and al Qaeda with the invasion 
of Afghanistan in early October 2001. The American military re-
quired support facilities for these operations, and Uzbekistan – a 
country strategically located on Afghanistan’s north ern border 
– became a crucial ally in the war on terror.
169 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People”, 20 September 2001. (The White House [Online 15 Nov 2005]).
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Long before the September 2001 attacks, the US military had 
commissioned a study conducted by the RAND Corporation to 
examine potential causes of confl ict in Central Asia and analyze 
possible alternatives for military operations in the region. Made 
publicly available in 2003, Faultlines of Confl ict in Central Asia 
and the South Caucasus contained comprehensive data on a wide 
range of topics, including the availability of air bases suitable to 
American military needs. According to the study, Uzbekistan had 
the best infrastructure and lines of communication to support 
“ma jor airlift operations”, and therefore “US military planners 
be gan to pursue access to former Soviet military airfi elds in 
Uzbekistan”.170 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan all border Afghanistan, 
a necessary logistical factor to support US operations there. Taji-
ki stan was used as a logistics hub to transport personnel and 
supplies into Afghanistan, but the “operational environment (…) 
complicates any deployments and compounds force protection 
concerns”.171 The list of problems with any substantial military 
basing in Tajikistan was long: unrest remaining from the 1992–
97 civil war, Tajikistan’s dependence on around 16,000 Russian 
troops as border guards, lack of central government control over 
Tajik territory, and heavy narcotics traffi cking in collusion with 
local authorities.172 American forces and their allies (French and 
Italian) made use of Tajik facilities near the Afghan border, but the 
situation was less than ideal. Turkmenistan has pursued a policy 
of non-alignment and therefore had limited security cooperation 
with the US, although it did authorize overfl ight of its territory.173
In an event brimming with both strategic and symbolic signi-
fi cance, US military aircraft landed at an airbase outside Tashkent 
in late September 2001, along with several hundred personnel.174 
170 William O’Malley, “Central Asia and South Caucasus as an area of operations: 
Challenges and Constraints” in Faultlines of Confl ict in Central Asia and the South 
Caucasus: Implications for the US Army, eds. Olga Oliker and Thomas Szanya 
(Arroyo Center: RAND, 2003), pp. 264–5.
171 Ibid, p. 267.
172 O’Malley, “Central Asia and South Caucasus”.
173 Ibid.
174 Susan B. Glasser, “First US Planes land at Uzbek Air Base”, Washington Post, 23 
September 2001.
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President Karimov had offi cially offered the use of three Uzbek 
airfi elds and opened his country’s airspace for US-led attacks on 
the Taliban in Afghanistan. The US quickly established an air base 
at Karshi-Kanabad (also known as K2) in southern Uzbekistan, 
manned with US Air Force personnel and elements of the US Army’s 
10th Mountain Division.175 An established American military 
pre sence in Russia’s Near Abroad demonstrated how much the 
geopolitical landscape had shifted in just a decade. The US base 
at K2 was crucial to the Afghanistan campaign and demonstrated 
American willingness to involve itself in Central Asia more deeply 
than just foreign aid and diplomatic partnerships.176
As to the necessity of the Central Asian bases to the Afghan 
war, “it cannot be overemphasized that these countries provided 
crucial staging bases on the perimeter of Afghanistan that allowed 
the United States to more effectively and effi ciently move assets in-
to the combat zone”.177 The K2 base, by virtue of its consistently 
good fl ying weather, easy availability of fuel, and access to 
Afghanistan, became a “critical refueling and logistics nexus” for 
the United States.178 The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA – a 
statement of understanding drafted when US troops are stationed 
in a foreign country) between the US and Uzbekistan was quickly 
signed on 7 October 2001. The terms of the SOFA “were vague 
enough to allow the US to begin moving immediately and to deal 
with the details later”.179 The Bush administration was unwilling 
to conduct aerial bombing raids over northern Afghanistan with-
out a search and rescue base close by to support the missions, and 
negotiations with Tashkent took on an urgent tone as nearly the 
entire campaign depended upon this detail.180 The air war com-
menced over Afghanistan just one hour after the SOFA was in 
175 “America and Uzbekistan Seal Strategic Partnership”, Jamestown Monitor, 19 
March 2002.
176 A second base at the civilian airport in Manas, Krygyzstan also played a signifi cant 
role in the Afghan campaign and increased the US presence in the region. 
177 O’Malley, “Central Asia and South Caucasus”, p. 269.
178 Meppen, “US-Uzbek Bilateral Relations: Policy Options”, p.17. This was also 
confi rmed though interviews conducted by the author in Tashkent, February/March 
2006.
179 Ibid, p. 16.
180 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).
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place, highlighting K2’s importance to Operation Enduring Free-
dom.181
Strategic Partnership
After successful negotiations by Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, President Karimov traveled to Washington in March 
2002 for the signing of a more comprehensive accord between the 
two countries, the Strategic Partnership Agreement. This document 
outlined a framework for cooperation on a range of issues including 
economic reforms, democratization, humanitarian assistance, and 
military cooperation. It began by recognizing “the importance of 
competent implementation of democratic and market reforms in 
Uzbekistan as a necessary condition for ensuring political, social, 
and economic stability, sustainable development, prosperity and 
national security”.182 In effect, the US agreed to remain closely 
involved in Uzbekistan’s security and assist in modernizing the 
Uzbek armed forces, while the Karimov regime promised to co-
operate in US counterterrorism efforts and pursue a series of 
political reforms. This was clearly how the State Department 
interpreted the Strategic Partnership Agreement. In November 
2002 Assistant Secretary of State Lorne Craner declared: 
We are grateful for the support that Uzbekistan has provided 
in the war on terror. But the United States will not sacrifi ce its 
long-term commitment to protect human rights for short-term 
political expediency (…) The Uzbek government has (…) made a 
commitment to improve human rights, but we see mixed results on 
the ground, and there is obviously still a long way to go.183
Absent from the agreement was any mention of payment for basing 
rights or promises of remuneration for cooperation, an issue which 
would resurface in the following months. 
181 United States Department of State: “Frequently Asked Questions about US Policy in 
Central Asia”, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (U.S. Department of State 
[online 6 Nov]).
182 United States Department of State, Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and 
Cooperation Framework Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs ([online 2 Nov 2006]).
183 “Press statement and press conference of Lorne Craner, assistant secretary of 
state for democracy, human rights and labor”, Public Affairs Section Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan, 8 November 2002, US Embassy in Uzbekistan ([online 2 Nov 2006]).
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During Karimov’s White House visit, President Bush expressed 
his appreciation for Uzbekistan’s cooperation with US-led Afgha-
nistan operations and pressed the Uzbek president on human rights 
issues, according to a White House spokesman.184 In congressional 
testimony the previous day, Secretary of State Colin Powell had 
characterized Uzbekistan as a “solid coalition partner”, while in-
sis ting that human rights issues were still a point of discussion 
between the two countries.185 Earlier in the year, US Assistant Sec-
retary of State Elizabeth Jones remarked that Washington sen sed 
a new commitment by the Karimov regime to improving human 
rights in his country.186 The limited political opposition remaining 
in Uzbekistan also had reason to be hopeful after hearing promises 
of democratic reform from the Uzbek authorities as well as the 
liberalist rhetoric from Washington. Increased US engagement in 
the country could bring about real change in Tashkent, and ac-
cor ding to one opposition leader Uzbeks were both “excited and 
ap prehensive” after 2001.187
Balancing military aid and human rights: Congressional 
hearings
Another congressional hearing in 2002, this time before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee entitled “Balancing Military 
Assistance and Support for Human Rights in Central Asia”, di-
rectly addressed the themes discussed in this study. The panel of 
wit nesses had an interesting composition: three of the fi ve witnesses 
providing testimony were members of the Bush administration; 
the fourth was a former US ambassador to Kazakhstan and now 
the senior vice president of a military subcontractor. Academic Dr. 
Martha Brill Olcott, who appeared regularly before such hearings, 
rounded out the list.
Committee chairman Senator Robert Torricelli began by noting 
that “rooting out terrorism and promoting democracy and human 
184 Dana Milbank, “Uzbekistan Thanked for Role in War”, Washington Post, 13 
March 2002.
185 Ibid.
186 Frank T. Csongos, “Uzbekistan: US Boosting Aid to Tashkent”, RFE/RL, 31 
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rights are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they are probably 
mu tually reinforcing”, explaining that undemocratic regimes 
marginalize and radicalize their populations, leading to terrorism 
and instability.188 Lorne Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, testifi ed to some of the 
reform successes in Uzbekistan, including arranging for better In-
ternational Red Cross access to prisons, the registration of one 
human rights NGO, and the invitation extended by the Uzbek 
government to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture. 
Craner agreed with Senator Torricelli that military assistance and 
human rights “need not be a question of balance and competing 
in te rests, but can, as we’re attempting, be an issue of mutually 
re inforcing goals”.189 Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch 
concurred: 
All of the Central Asian countries have told us that OEF (Operation 
Enduring Freedom) directly addresses their security concerns, 
namely terrorism and religious extremism (…) narco-traffi ckers 
(…) and the transnational threat of weapons of mass destruction. 
And I think because our action is in a security interest, this provides 
us more leverage, frankly, on the human rights side than we would 
have if we were in a position where they were simply doing us a 
favor (…) Our interests are complementary.190
Lynn Pascoe, Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia, then 
commented that “I listened to both of you gentlemen’s [Craner and 
Crouch] opening statements very carefully and it occurred to me 
how closely we agree on this question”.191 Pascoe saw “no confl ict 
whatsoever” between American military cooperation with Central 
Asian countries and human rights concerns in those countries.192 
Assistant Secretary Craner pointed out that the US had now mostly 
eliminated the terrorist threat in Central Asia, a rationale given by 
the countries in the region for having closed political systems.193 
188 Balancing Military Assistance and Support for Human Rights in Central Asia, 
Hearing of the Central Asia and South Caucasus Subcommittee of the Senate 
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Former Ambassador William Courtney provided a comprehensive 
strategy for the region: increasing security assistance, maintaining 
a US military presence, focusing more attention on human rights 
and democracy, remembering that “US security cooperation 
boosts government legitimacy, which offers a source of leverage 
for promoting human rights and democracy”, working with allies 
in Europe to effect change in the region, and promoting long-term 
change by focusing on youth programs.194 All four witnesses con-
nected to the Bush administration agreed that no balance needed 
to be struck between military assistance and support for human 
rights, as they were complementary interests.
Dr. Olcott testifi ed last and warned that “unless the US fi nds 
some more effective means of leveraging these states, there 
could be some highly undesirable and even violent (and at least 
unscheduled) regime changes throughout the region.195 She warned 
that American human rights policy and democracy promotion 
strategies were “unlikely to lead to any major change in the nature 
of our partner regimes in Central Asia” because undemocratic 
regimes were “deeply rooted throughout the region”.196 Seemingly 
contradicting herself in the very next breath, Olcott then argued 
that the US should not abandon its human rights policy, but 
should instead devote even more funding to these programs, and 
that the US was “moving in the right direction”.197 Dr. Olcott’s 
testimony provided some pessimism to an otherwise optimistic 
hearing in which the witnesses from the administration reaffi rmed 
their belief that the US was proceeding appropriately and correctly 
in its foreign policy. Even Olcott, despite her pessimism, had few 
criticisms of US policy.
IMU threat seemed to dissipate as many of the IMU fi ghters had reportedly gone 
to Afghanistan to fi ght with the Taliban against American forces [Richard Weitz, 
“Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU)” Studies in Confl ict and Terrorism, vol. 27 (2004): 505–530].
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US involvement in Uzbekistan increases 
dramatically 
US government assistance to Uzbekistan increased dramatically 
from $58 million in 2001 to $221 million in 2002, which included 
supplemental funding of $128 million in addition to the $95 
million budgeted.198 These funds provided $36 million in FMF 
money, $18 million for border security, and almost $80 million in 
Defense Department excess and privately donated humanitarian 
commodities.199 The security assistance provided funds for non-
proliferation activities in Uzbekistan (the Nunn Lugar Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program) including clean-up of Soviet biological 
weapons laboratories, as well as funding for the purchase of military 
equipment and assistance directed at increasing Uzbek border 
security. The $4 million earmarked for democracy programs in 
Uzbekistan was increased by the emergency supplemental to $8 
million for 2002. With the aid package also came an additional $70 
million in credit guarantees from the US Export-Import Bank.200
The funding increases for USAID-implemented civil society 
programs in Uzbekistan further exacerbated a growing tension 
within the country over NGO activity. With the growing US 
involvement in economic and social development programs came 
an increased awareness and activism among the Uzbeks involved 
in or targeted by the NGOs. Encouraged to create their own lo-
cal NGOs that could deal with the problems of ordinary Uzbek 
citizens, these budding NGO leaders became increasingly vocal 
about conditions in the country. This refl ected badly upon the 
government, which in turn became increasingly suspicious of the 
NGO community.201
A darker aspect of the United States’ relationship with Uzbe-
kistan developed after the September 2001 terrorist attacks when 
President Bush signed a still-classifi ed directive giving the Central 
198 United States Department of State, US Government Assistance to and Cooperative 
Activities with Eurasia: 2002, Offi ce of the Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe 
and Eurasia, U.S. (Department of State [online Oct–Dec 2005]).
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200 Ibid.
201 Interviews conducted by the author in Tashkent, February/March 2006.
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Intelligence Agency “expansive” authority to transport suspected 
terrorists to foreign countries for interrogation.202 This practice 
– known as extraordinary rendition – was also used prior to 2001, 
but became widespread after Bush granted the CIA extended 
authority.203 In The New Yorker magazine, a story on rendition 
included this passage on Uzbekistan:
Craig Murray, the former British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, told 
me that “the US accepts quite a lot of intelligence from the Uzbeks” 
that has been extracted from suspects who have been tortured. 
This information was, he said, “largely rubbish.” He said he knew 
of “at least three” instances where the US had rendered suspected 
militants from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan. Although Murray does 
not know the fate of the three men, he said, “They almost certainly 
would have been tortured.” In Uzbekistan, he said, “partial boiling 
of a hand or an arm is quite common.” He also knew of two cases 
in which prisoners had been boiled to death. In 2002, Murray, 
concerned that America was complicit with such a regime, asked 
his deputy to discuss the problem with the CIA’s station chief 
in Tashkent. He said that the station chief did not dispute that 
intelligence was being obtained under torture. But the CIA did not 
consider this a problem. “There was no reason to think they were 
perturbed,” Murray told me.204
The CIA denied that any such meeting took place.205 According 
to several sources, the US rendered dozens of suspects to the Uz-
bek authorities.206 Such allegations are even more disconcerting 
considering the 2002 United Nations report by Theo von Boven, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture. In his report, van Boven 
characterized torture in the country’s prisons and detention facilities 
as “systematic”.207 Human Rights Watch reported that Uzbekistan 
continued its human rights abuses on a “massive scale” in 2002, 
the Karimov regime “systematically violating the rights to freedom 
202 Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, “Rule Change Lets CIA Freely Send Suspects 
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204 Jane Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture”, New Yorker, 14 February 2005.
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207 “UN Investigator Condemns Systematic Use of Torture in Uzbekistan”, RFE/RL 
Newsline, 9 December 2002.
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of religion, expression, association, and assembly. There was no 
independent judiciary, and torture was widespread.”208 The US 
State Department annual country report agreed that Tashkent’s 
human rights record was “very poor, and it continued to commit 
numerous serious abuses”.209
Summary: Trying to do it all
The period after the September 2001 terrorist attacks tested more 
than ever the United States’ foreign policy priorities with regard 
to security, democracy, and human rights. A sudden increase of 
activity and cooperation ensued between the US and several Cen-
tral Asian countries. Although the US recognized and actively pur-
sued its security interest in Uzbekistan prior to 2001, the war in 
Afghanistan elevated this to an entirely new level with the need 
for basing rights and logistical support for the Afghan campaign. 
There was no doubt that the US greatly desired cooperation from 
the Karimov regime after 2001, and that Uzbekistan’s assistance to 
the US was of great value to military operations in Afghanistan.
In addition, the Karimov regime exhibited a clear failure to 
improve its human rights record despite US statements which 
routinely mentioned progress in this area – concessions by the 
Uzbek government in 2002 included the release of some 800 
political prisoners, granting access to the UN Rapporteur on 
Torture, and allowing an Uzbek human rights organization register 
as an offi cial NGO.210 Human Rights Watch discounted the 
moves as gestures without any real substance.211 Just one example 
of these superfi cial reform measures was Tashkent’s May 2002 
announcement that it had offi cially ended Uzbekistan’s policy of 
state censorship. Along with the announcement came a warning 
to the editors of the country’s six offi cial newspapers that they 
would now be responsible for the content of their newspapers, a 
208 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001: Uzbekistan (HRW, 2002 [online 1 Nov 
2006]).
209 United States Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 
2002 (US Government [online 1 Nov 2006]).
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211 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003: Uzbekistan (HRW, 2004 [online 1 Nov 
2006]).
SECURITY OR HUMAN RIGHTS?   69
threat that simply reinforced most editors’ existing habit of self-
censoring. Journalists brave enough to publish pieces critical of the 
government over the next few years were arrested and convicted 
on charges ranging from disseminating antigovernment propagan-
da to homosexuality. Despite its offi cial legal demise, censorship 
was alive and well in Uzbekistan.212
Increased US-Uzbek cooperation occurring alongside a conti-
nued lack of reform brought the foreign policy balancing act 
be tween human rights and security interests clearly into focus. 
Three general observations can be made about US policy during 
this period. First, funding for security-related programs increased 
substantially in 2002, as did military training and border security 
programs for the Uzbek government. The levels of security aid 
rose much more dramatically than those funds provided for social 
programs and democracy promotion, which were given small 
in creases. In a simplistic comparison of funding levels, securi ty 
concerns were the clear winner.213
Second, the actions and statements by the Bush administration 
revealed its intent to pursue security interests, democracy pro-
motion, and human rights policies simultaneously. These were, as 
was mentioned by US offi cials several times in testimony, mutually 
reinforcing goals. For some policymakers, stability and security 
were seen as necessary preconditions for political and economic 
liberalization. Karimov had justifi ed his regime’s tight control 
by pointing to Islamic extremists and terrorists who sought to 
destabilize the country. Operation Enduring Freedom severely 
weakened the IMU through targeting of its bases in Afghanistan 
during which IMU leader Juma Namangani was reportedly 
killed.214 As Secretary Craner pointed out, the reduction of this 
threat presented an opportunity for real reform. Perhaps these 
212 “Uzbekistan Abolishes Media Censorship”, 13 May 2002 and “Uzbek Human 
Rights Activist Sentenced”, 17 September 2002, both Associated Press (Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS [online 6 Nov 2006]).
213 Extra-budgetary funding during this period makes defi nitive computations of total 
assistance to Uzbekistan problematic, but the funding provided was no lower than 
those amounts listed in the previous section. 
214 Jim Nichol, “Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and US Interests”, CRS Report 
for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005) (National 
Defense University [online 6 Nov 2006]).
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seemingly divergent policy goals could be pursued concurrently 
through retraining of military and law enforcement agencies, 
economic development aid, and civil society programs. In short: 
a policy of positive engagement on both security and political 
reform.
Third, the reports of a CIA rendition program in Uzbekistan 
demonstrated more than American cooperation with the Karimov 
regime, it showed complicity. Although the US has yet to confi rm 
the specifi c reports concerning Uzbekistan, it has acknowledged 
that such a program exists. If terrorist suspects were indeed trans-
ferred to the Uzbek authorities for interrogation knowing those 
suspects would be tortured, there would be little doubt as to the 
administration’s political priorities. Rendering prisoners to the 
Karimov regime while highlighting normative ideals in its political 
rhetoric would leave the US government’s statements on democracy 
and human rights with little credibility.
Both the realist and liberalist factions in Washington felt sa tis-
fi ed with the state of relations between the two countries after the 
Strategic Partnership Agreement. Realists focused the continued 
survival of the state and urged the prioritization of purely national 
interests. The terrorist attacks of 2001 shocked the US on a level 
comparable to the 1941 surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl 
Harbor. The US, forced to defend itself against an asymmetrical 
threat, sought allies from a number of countries that did not share 
its democratic and normative ideals, including Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, Egypt, and Uzbekistan. The perceived need for self-
defense easily outweighed any political objections to cooperation 
with these states. The attention given by the United States to 
de mocratic reforms in Uzbekistan, genuine or not, made these 
policy decisions more palatable for both domestic and foreign 
audiences. 
According to the realists, monies provided for social programs 
and economic aid were meant to stabilize Uzbekistan so that it 
could be a reliable partner for the United States, while political 
reform was less of a priority and explains why little public pres-
sure was placed on the Karimov regime. Comments by President 
Bush, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State 
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Powell routinely praised Uzbekistan’s cooperation in the war 
on terror. Questions on human rights were met with the simple 
acknowledgement that these concerns were part of the dialogue 
between the two countries. Criticism came in the form of the State 
Department’s annual country reports, which had consistently 
reported the abuses of the Karimov regime for several years with 
only very limited high level acknowledgement by US offi cials of 
their content.
Meanwhile, the liberalist rhetoric from the Bush administration 
espoused freedom and democracy. The US won some minor 
concessions from the Karimov regime in 2002, resulting directly 
from American pressures on the Uzbek government. The US was 
greatly encouraged by this progress and interpreted these actions 
by Karimov as a major development.215 A strategy of engagement 
in order to promote reform from within continued to be a 
rationale for US policy, similar to the previous period. Funding 
for democracy promotion saw large increases though it continued 
to be a fraction of the security budget. Other social programs 
and economic development assistance received a boost in funding 
as well. The inclusion of political reforms in the 2002 Strategic 
Partnership Agreement alongside promises of security cooperation 
strengthened the liberalist position. 
It became clear during this period that the US attempted to 
pursue all three interests – security, human rights, and democracy 
promotion – concurrently. Those in the administration favoring a 
liberalist approach were satisfi ed with the increases in democracy 
promotion aid and promises of political reform in the Strategic 
Partnership Agreement. The realists in the administration were 
satisfi ed as well, viewing the establishment of an American milita ry 
presence in Uzbekistan as vital to the Afghan campaign, as well as 
an important step toward countering Russian or Chinese attempts 
to gain infl uence in Central Asia. The congressional hearings on 
balancing military interests and human rights concerns showed 
contentment with US policy from all sides. This all-encompassing 
policy proved to be unsustainable.
215 Interviews conducted by the author in Tashkent, February/March 2006.
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Chapter 6
The Relationship Deteriorates 
2004–05
The ‘color revolutions’ and NGOs
After almost two years of what some described as a ‘honeymoon 
period’ between the US and Uzbekistan, during which Uzbek 
co operation in the war on terror was rewarded with a minimal 
amount of criticism on human rights and democracy issues, the 
relationship slowly began to fray. In mid-2003, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell attested to Uzbekistan’s substantial and continued 
progress toward improving its human rights record, but noted that 
the Karimov regime’s record “remained very poor and it continued 
to commit serious abuses”.216 The State Department’s annual report 
listed some improvements: no credible reports of any deaths in 
Uzbek custody, increased cooperation with human rights workers, 
few human rights advocates arrested and no journalists arrested 
in 2003.217 Human Rights Watch reported that while “Uzbekistan 
has made some attempts to convince the international community 
that it is improving its human rights record (…) the situation re-
mains grave”.218
When protesters stormed the Georgian parliament building in 
216 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003.
217 United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
2003 (Washington DC, 2004).
218 Human Rights Watch, Annual Report 2003
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November 2003 and deposed President Eduard Shevardnadze in 
the Rose Revolution, reports of US-funded NGO involvement in 
the revolution led President Karimov to take a harder line against 
the international NGOs operating in Uzbekistan. The regime im-
plemented new procedures almost immediately. All grants from 
international NGOs to local organizations were halted pending 
an administrative review. Organizations wishing to fund projects 
in the country were forced to switch their accounts to one of two 
banks, both controlled by the regime, where a panel would decide 
whether individual grants would be awarded.219 The government 
organ responsible for liaising with the international NGOs 
switched from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of 
Justice, a more heavy-handed agency.220 The new regulations were 
contradictory and made compliance almost impossible. Inspec-
tions of NGO records and operating procedures increased, as did 
petty harassment.221 
Ukraine followed suit the following year with an Orange Revo-
lution in November 2004. Massive protests erupted after a rigged 
presidential contest, ultimately leading to the invalidation of the 
electoral results. Reports of NGO involvement again surfaced in 
the media. In the British newspaper The Guardian, a news analysis 
reported on US complicity in fostering ‘democratic’ revolutions in 
Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, along with a failed attempt in Belarus.222 
The US reportedly spent over $40 million on campaign advertising 
to defeat Milosevic at the ballot box and around $14 million on 
the Ukraine regime change.223 
The phenomena struck a third time in March 2005 in neighboring 
Kyrgyzstan, with a disorganized and accidental Tulip Revolution 
that sent President Askar Akayev into exile in Moscow. The US 
had spent heavily on pro-democracy programs there; Kyrgyzstan’s 
population is a fi fth of Uzbekistan’s and received nearly twice 
219 Interviews conducted by the author in Tashkent, February/March 2006.
220 “Uzbekistan Tightens Control on Groups”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute 
Analyst, Johns Hopkins University, 22 January 2004.
221 Interviews conducted by the author in Tashkent, February/March 2006.
222 Ian Traynor, “US Campaign Behind the Turmoil in Kiev”, The Guardian, 26 
November 2004.
223 Carothers, Critical Mission; Guardian 26 November 2004.
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the democracy promotion funding ($15 million) than its larger 
neighbor.224 US grants allowed for the creation of television talk 
shows and opposition debates, while US-funded equipment broad-
casted these programs to places outside Bishkek such as southern 
Kyrgyzstan, where the protests began.225 In Bishkek, the unrest 
was fueled in part by pictures depicting the nearly-completed 
Akayev family villa published in an opposition newspaper, the 
prin ting of which was made possible by the US-funded NGO 
Freedom House.226 After the government cut the electricity to the 
building housing the printing presses, the US embassy delivered 
two generators so that the last batch of opposition papers could 
be printed.227
Although the ‘color revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan resulted from a 
host of complex factors, the media support provided by NGOs and 
the US State Department helped to fan the fl ames of protest which 
resulted in Akayev fl eeing the country. Freedom House project 
manager Mike Stone’s triumphant announcement to the world: 
“Mission accomplished” was widely interpreted as referring to 
the regime change, although Stone claimed he was talking about 
printing the newspapers and that “The intention was to assist media 
development. It wasn’t to create a revolution”.228 The opposition 
newspaper editor, Alexander Kim, acknowledged the role of US 
and NGO activities in Kyrgyzstan, saying “The result is that the 
society became politicized, they were informed (…) The role of 
the NGOs and independent media were crucial factors in the 
revolution.”229 Those NGOs which reportedly played a role in the 
revolutions – the National Democratic Institute, the International 
Republican Institute, Freedom House, the Open Society Institute – 
were all organizations active in Uzbekistan as well. In the months 
224 US State Department Fact Sheet, “US Assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic Fiscal 
Year 2005”, 17 August 2005; US State Department Fact Sheet, “US Assistance to 
Uzbekistan, Fiscal Year 2005”, 17 August 2005.
225 Craig Smith, “US Helped to Prepare the Way for Kyrgyzstan’s Uprising”, New York 
Times, 30 March 2005.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
228 Richard Spencer, “Quiet American Behind Tulip Revolution”, Telegraph, 2 March 
2005.
229 Smith, “US Helped to Prepare the Way…”
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following the Kyrgyzstan revolution, the Karimov regime began 
closing US-funded NGOs.230 
The US increases pressure for reforms and 
cuts aid
The State Department suddenly became increasingly critical of 
Tashkent and US foreign policy began placing greater emphasis on 
human rights and democratic reform. In December 2003, the State 
Department for the fi rst time decertifi ed Uzbekistan with respect 
to non-proliferation CTR funding, but President Bush waived the 
human rights restrictions and funding was ultimately unaffected.231 
The State Department reiterated in January that Uzbekistan had 
failed to meet international human rights standards.232 Hin ting 
towards a shift in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, President Karimov 
and President Vladimir Putin of Russia signed a strategic part-
nership agreement in June 2004.233 David Lewis, an analyst with 
the International Crisis Group, said the move refl ected a break-
down in US-Uzbek relations due to human rights concerns in 
Washington and therefore the uncertainty of future US aid to the 
Uzbek government.234 
A congressional hearing in June 2004 dealt specifi cally with US 
policy toward Uzbekistan. Offi cials from the Bush administration, 
including Secretaries Pascoe and Craner, testifi ed before the House 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, reiterating 
230 The linkage between the ‘color revolutions’ and the crackdown on NGOs in 
Uzbekistan was confi rmed repeatedly through interviews conducted by the author 
in Tashkent, February/March 2006.
231 George W. Bush, “Memorandum for the Secretary of State: Presidential 
Determination: No. 2004-19”, 30 December 2003 (White House [online 2 Nov 
2006]). In December 2004, the State Department again failed to certify Uzbekistan 
as eligible for CTR funding and President Bush once again waived the human rights 
requirement, citing national security interests. Uzbekistan continued to receive the 
funding (George W. Bush, “Memorandum for the Secretary of State: Presidential 
Determination: No. 2005-13”, 14 December 2004 (White House [online 20 Jan 
2006])). 
232 Dana Linzer, “US Assails Uzbekistan Policies, Trims Aid”, Washington Post, 14 July 
2004.
233 Antoine Blua, “Russia/Uzbekistan: Presidents Sign Strategic Partnership 
Agreement”, RFE/RL, 17 June 2004.
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their positions that human rights and democracy promotion were 
being pursued alongside American security interests. Committee 
chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen acknowledged Uzbekistan’s 
co operation with American efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq (the 
Karimov regime was one of the fi rst to publicly support the US 
invasion), but insisted that the US “must press for greater political 
and economic reforms within Uzbekistan”.235 She observed that 
Congress had become increasingly frustrated with Uzbekistan’s lack 
of reform and inserted provisions into the Foreign Appropriations 
Bill for 2004 that would limit funding for the Karimov regime if 
the State Department could not certify progress toward reforms 
measures promised in the 2002 Strategic Partnership Agreement. 
The Congresswoman maintained these commitments had not been 
met and that funding would be cut on 1 July 2004 if no progress 
could be shown.236
One month later, on 13 July, the Bush administration announced 
an $18 million cut in military and economic aid to Uzbekistan due 
to the State Department’s determination that the Karimov regime 
had failed to institute reforms outlined in the Strategic Partnership 
Agreement.237 Unlike previous legislation, the 2004 stipulations 
from Congress did not come with a clause allowing the president 
to waive the restrictions based on national security concerns, a 
situation lamented as “unfortunate” by the State Department, 
which had hoped for “a more nuanced approach to encourage com-
pliance”.238 Due to some funds being redirected and other monies 
reinstated only about $7 million in aid was actually withheld, with 
IMET and FMF programs the most affected.239
According to the State Department press release, “Uzbekistan 
has made some encouraging progress over the past year with 
235 Uzbekistan: The Key to Success in Central Asia? hearing before the Subcommittee 
on the Middle East and Central Asia of the Committee on International Relations, 
House of Representatives, 15 June 2004, Federal News Service ([online 2 Nov 
2006]).
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CRS Report for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005) 
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respect to human rights. We are, however, disappointed by lack 
of progress on democratic reform and restrictions put on US as-
sistance partners on the ground”.240 The reference to restrictions 
on American-funded NGOs may explain the administration’s 
move to decertify while simultaneously pointing to ‘encouraging 
pro gress’ by the Karimov regime. The US had earlier threatened 
sanctions against Uzbekistan due to the new restrictions on NGOs 
that violated a 1994 bilateral agreement between the two countries 
con cerning such groups.241 The 2004 decertifi cation seemed to be 
a direct response to the continued NGO restrictions.
Tashkent was the scene of several bombings in March 2004, 
killing 19 people and wounding over 20 in attacks attributed to 
Hizb ut-Tahrir and the IMU.242 Three days of unrest followed and 
the death toll climbed to 50 while Uzbek authorities conducted 
ope rations aimed at eliminating alleged terrorists.243 As the trial of 
those suspected of involvement in the March violence commenced 
four months later in July 2004, three more bombings struck 
Tashkent – this time targeting the American and Israeli embassies 
along with the offi ces of the Uzbek chief prosecutor.244 Human 
rights organizations warned of an impending crackdown by the 
re gime. When hundreds of suspects were arrested rather than the 
thousands detained after the 1999 bombings, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Lynn Pascoe remarked on the improvement 
in congressional hearings, praising the government’s measured 
response.245 The attacks represented the fi rst real antigovernment 
violence since the US military presence began in Uzbekistan 
following 9/11.
240 Boucher, Richard: Daily Press Briefi ng 13 July 2004, US State Department Press 
Release ([online 7 Nov 2006]).
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Disagreements over Karshi-Khanabad
By late 2003, the Uzbek government had become increasingly 
dis satisfi ed with the basing arrangement at Karshi-Khanabad. It 
was standing US policy to differentiate between the use of civilian 
airports (where landing fees were paid) and military airstrips (where 
they were not). The US therefore paid landing rights fees for use of 
the civilian base in Kyrgyzstan, while it did not pay for the use of 
the military base at K2. Tashkent apparently felt slighted by this 
arrangement. The Karimov regime offered up at least six drafts 
of an agreement on the long-term use of Karshi-Khanabad from 
late 2003 to early 2005; all were rejected by the administration 
without comment.246 President Karimov, hoping to sidestep the 
more critical State Department, eventually sent a personal letter 
directly to President Bush requesting more economic aid. This too 
was rejected.247
As a way to improve its negotiating position and increase the 
pressure on the US, Tashkent implemented restrictions on car go 
fl ights into K2, claiming the runway was being damaged by the 
heavy aircraft – a claim refuted by US engineers.248 In res ponse, 
the US initiated a study to determine how the runway might 
be improved, and eventually arranged funding to rebuild the 
airstrip. The Defense Department had been provided with sub-
stantial supplemental funding by Congress in 2003 and 2004 for 
miscellaneous expenses related to the war on terror, and $10.7 
million from the fund was used to reimburse Uzbekistan in 2003 
for “expenses Tashkent initially incurred in moving its forces off 
of Karshi-Khanabad Air Base to other locations, and for continued 
services in providing security for the installation.”249 Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld began looking into how the Defense 
Department itself might use this type of funding to ‘reimburse’ 
the Uzbek government for use of K2 and negotiations continued 
over long-term US access to the base.250 In August, Richard Myers, 
246 Ibid. Tensions between the US and Uzbekistan over the payment of landing fees 
surfaced repeatedly in interviews conducted in Tashkent in February/March 2006.
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the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – the Pentagon’s top 
military offi cial – traveled to Central Asia. During his Uzbekistan 
visit, Myers criticized the aid cuts due to State Department decer-
tifi cation as “shortsighted” and not “productive”.251 He then 
an nounced that the Pentagon would add $21 million in non-
proliferation funds and the transfer of fourteen patrol boats worth 
nearly $3 million.252 
After funding spiked in 2002, US assistance the following year 
was reduced: total assistance amounted to $93 million, with $5.2 
million for democracy/civil society, $37 million in security as-
sistance, and credit guarantees from the US Export-Import Bank 
worth $96 million.253 For 2004, Uzbekistan received just over $85 
million in US assistance, including $39 million in security and law 
enforcement aid, $19 million for democratic reform programs.254 
The US provided Uzbekistan with humanitarian aid from 2003–
05 in excess of $78 million.255 With the Strategic Partnership 
decertifi cation in place, FMF and IMEF funding for 2004 was 
withheld. Total US assistance to Uzbekistan for 2005 amounted 
to $101 million, including $9 million in democracy promotion/
civil society programs and $86.3 million in security aid.256 The 
security aid total includes the $23 million paid by the Defense 
Department for K2 as well as $24 million budgeted but withheld 
due to decertifi cation.257 One estimate placed the total assistance 
to Uzbekistan for security and border control since September 
2001 at over $500 million.258 
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Tragedy in Andijan
By late spring 2005, US-Uzbek relations had noticeably deterio-
rated due to tensions over K2 and harassment of American-funded 
NGOs in the country. The killings in Andijan simply tipped the 
balance and unleashed a chain of events that would ultimately 
end US-Uzbek cooperation. The violence in the Fergana Valley 
town of Andijan on 13 May 2005 stemmed from the trial of 23 
successful local businessmen who stood accused of “extremism, 
fundamentalism, and separatism” and belonging to a radical Is la-
mic group called the Akromiya.259 The trial, begun three months 
earlier in February, had led to daily protests outside the courthouse 
by family members of those accused and others sympathetic to 
their plight. On the night of 12 May, as the verdicts in the trial 
were delayed for some reason, armed men took over the local po-
lice station and attacked the prison. They freed the 23 accused 
along with a substantial number of other prisoners – some of them 
reportedly with IMU connections – and made their way to the local 
government building where they took several hostages.260 Later 
that morning the crowd gathered in Babur Square grew to several 
thousand as others heard of the large meeting in progress, and the 
protesters who occupied the government building on the square 
demanded to negotiate with the authorities.261 Several telephone 
communications between protest leaders and the Interior Minister 
Zakir Almatov occurred, and Almatov reportedly offered the pro-
testers safe passage to Kyrgyzstan.262 President Karimov fl ew to 
Andijan in order to personally direct operations to regain control 
over the government buildings.263 
259 Offi ce of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Preliminary 
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Throughout the day, armored vehicles drove past the square and 
fi red repeatedly into the crowd, killing and wounding a substan-
tial number of them.264 People remained in the square despite 
these attacks, believing that they would be safer as a group and 
due to rumors that President Karimov was on his way to address 
the crowd; a helicopter appeared overhead which lent credibility 
to the rumor.265 That evening, according to witnesses, armored 
personnel carriers arrived with government troops and began 
shooting intensely into the crowd while other soldiers stormed 
the government building.266 The crowd then began to fl ee down 
the only street not then occupied by government soldiers, and 
were attacked by snipers as they moved away from the square.267 
Government sources reported (and the Akiner report supports this 
fi gure) a total of 187 people killed while all other reports main-
tain that 400–750 died.268 Hundreds of residents fl ed the violence 
and around 500 of them eventually ended up in refugee camps in 
neighboring Kyrgyzstan.269
While the European Union immediately blamed the Karimov 
regime for the violence, the initial US response to these events was 
muted as State Department spokesman Richard Boucher called on 
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the government and the protesters to exercise restraint, but also 
voiced concerns that some of those freed in the prison break were 
IMU terrorists.270 Five days later at a daily briefi ng, Boucher had 
this to say:
We deeply regret that loss of life and are deeply concerned of reports 
of indiscriminate fi ring by Uzbek authorities on demonstrators 
last Friday. At the same time, I think it’s clear that the episode 
began by an armed attack on the prison and on other government 
facilities. There are reports of hostage-taking and other claims that 
should be investigated. Nothing justifi ed such acts of violence. And 
we’re also concerned about reports of the release or the escape of 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan members. We need to reiterate, I 
think, the bottom line that real economic and democratic reform 
and an end to human rights abuses are essential to the stability of 
Uzbekistan.271
The State Department signaled on 25 May that US-Uzbek 
cooperation on counterterrorism would not be diminished by 
the events in Andijan as it was based on the “common interests” 
of both countries.272 Spokesman Boucher pointed out that the 
US would “continue to press for the kinds of changes in the 
human rights situation” that provides “the best bulwark against 
terrorism”.273 After the international community repeatedly de-
manded an independent investigation of Andijan, the newly 
appointed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice eventually joined 
their calls for an inquiry. A US congressional delegation made up 
of Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and John Sununu, 
arrived in Uzbekistan in late May. They met with representatives 
of unregistered opposition parties in the country. The entire dele-
gation was initially refused permission to enter the country – a 
decision that was reversed just two days before the trip – and even 
then Uzbek offi cials fl atly refused to meet with them.274 By July, 
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the State Department had announced that levels of future aid to 
Uzbekistan could be dependent on such an investigation.275
Relations rapidly decline
The timing of the Andijan violence coincided with US-Uzbek 
negotiations over the long-term use of the K2 airbase. The Kari-
mov regime began complaining even louder about inadequate 
compensation for the base soon after some aid to Uzbekistan was 
cut due to the 2004 decertifi cation, and imposed restrictions on 
night fl ights and C-17 cargo aircraft operations after US calls for 
an independent inquiry into Andijan.276 Although some saw these 
moves by Karimov simply as negotiating tactics, the fate of K2 was 
not at all certain. Congressional leaders pressed the administration 
to halt talks on basing until Karimov agreed to an investigation, 
and even senior Defense Department offi cials questioned whether 
Uzbekistan was “the right place for us to be” in the long run.277 
Meetings between US and Uzbek representatives occurred in April 
and May, but a planned meeting to continue the negotiations never 
occurred due to Andijan.278
Further complicating the already tense and complex US-Uzbek 
relationship were the Andijan refugees in Kyrgyzstan. The UN 
refugee agency UNHCR reported in July that the Uzbek government 
had repeatedly demanded that Kyrgyzstan return the refugees 
while UNHCR revealed that efforts were underway to fl y them 
to a third country.279 Among those working for the evacuation of 
the Uzbek refugees was US Secretary of State Rice, who played a 
275 Andrew Tully, “US Says Uzbek Response on Probe Could Affect Aid”, RFE/RL, 13 
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prominent role and even placed last minute phone calls to Kyrgyz 
leaders to arrange for the refugees to be fl own to Romania.280 
The morning airlift on 29 July 2005 led to an immediate response 
from the Karimov regime, which sent a diplomatic note to the 
US embassy in Tashkent later that day ordering the US to leave 
the airbase at K2 within 180 days. The eviction notice came less 
than a month after a summit held by the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) – whose members include Russia, China, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan – approved 
a declaration demanding a timeframe for US withdrawal from its 
bases in Central Asia.281 
At a September Tashkent news briefi ng, US Assistant Secretary of 
State Daniel Fried said that the US was not appealing the decision 
and intended to vacate the base as requested.282 Fried announced 
that the US had agreed to pay the Uzbek government $23 million 
for services rendered to the K2 base during its four years of ope-
rations; nonpayment of such debts had been one complaint of the 
Uzbek government.283 Congress attempted to block the payment 
in October 2005 and make its dispersal dependent on a renewal 
of Uzbek cooperation on counterterrorism and an independent 
inquiry into the Andijan violence.284 Instead, Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld used 2005 funds to complete the payment.285 The last 
US military planes left the K2 base in Karshi-Khanabad on 21 
November, well before the deadline imposed by the Karimov 
regime.286 After the 29 July eviction notice, Uzbekistan gradually 
terminated its cooperation with the US on anti-terrorism efforts, 
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revoked US over fl ight privileges, and shifted its focus towards 
Russia and China by signing agreements on closer military and 
economic cooperation.287
Summary: Policy breakdown
This fi nal period illustrates the culmination of Washington’s policy 
dilemma with Tashkent. The four years that the US operated out 
of the K2 airbase marked a period of intense cooperation between 
the two countries. Only during what proved to be the fi nal two 
years of US operations from K2 did Washington direct any strong 
criticisms at the Karimov regime’s human rights record and failure 
to implement any democratic reforms. The December 2003 
announcement by the State Department that Uzbekistan would 
lose its certifi cation for CTR funding was unexpected, especially 
after Powell’s testimony in mid-2003 that claimed progress was 
being made. The November 2003 revolution in Georgia and 
Tashkent’s immediate reaction against US-funded NGOs represent 
one plausible explanation.
The language of the 2004 decertifi cation announcement per-
taining to the Strategic Partnership Agreement speaks directly to 
the Karimov regime’s restrictions on US-fi nanced NGO programs 
in the country. Congressional legislation tied part of the Uzbek 
aid package to specifi c reforms mentioned in the 2002 Strategic 
Partnership Agreement and did not include the usual national se-
cu rity waiver. This may have forced the administration’s hand 
somewhat with regard to both certifi cations. Finally compelled 
by Congress to certify specifi c improvements rather than invoke 
broad generalities, the Bush administration made the choice to 
decertify. Although this move had little real effect on aid levels, it 
showed the Karimov regime that future American support might 
begin to depend on genuine reform. 
The apparent disagreement between the State Department, the 
Pentagon, the White House, and Congress fi rst became visible 
during these decertifi cations and became increasingly obvious in 
287 Robin Wright, “Uzbeks Stop Working with US Against Terrorism”, Washington 
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the following months. While Secretary of State Rice worked to-
wards forcing an independent inquiry into Andijan, Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld reportedly worked to block an investigation.288 
The split within the administration was painfully obvious in 2004 
when the Pentagon restored $24 million in aid to Uzbekistan 
after the State Department had withheld $21 million due to de-
certifi cation. Tensions between the Department of Defense and 
Congress surfaced again the next year after Andijan and the 
payment demanded by Karimov for services rendered at the K2 
airbase, when Congress unsuccessfully attempted to block the pay-
ment. Even disagreements within the State Department seemed 
possible, with Secretary Pascoe consistently claiming progress by 
the Uzbek regime while Secretary Craner focused much more on 
the failure to reform. 
Analyst Stephen Blank, writing just after the events in Andi-
jan, remarked that “to external observers American policy to-
wards Uzbekistan looks like it is divided, ambivalent, and un-
coordinated, despite administration claims to the contrary”.289 
Blank saw a need for a “coordinated inter-agency policy on Uz-
bekistan” so that Karimov could not “successfully play US cabinet 
departments against each other”.290 Media speculation of a divided 
administration led State Department spokesman Sean McCormack, 
speaking about Andijan on June 14, 2005, to declare: “We are 
speaking with one voice with respect to this issue”.291
In terms of the base eviction, the continued use of K2 by the 
Americans was already looking doubtful by the time of the Andijan 
crackdown in May 2005. Was the base important enough to US 
interests that other concerns were downplayed in a last-ditch effort 
to save the base? In early 2005, C-130 aircraft still transported 
on average 50 tons of cargo and 60 passengers a day through 
K2, supported by around 1000 military personnel at the base.292 
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The Defense Department claimed that the loss of K2 presented 
logistical problems, but would not noticeably affect operations in 
Afghanistan or in the war on terror.293 One analyst argued that the 
loss of the Uzbek base places increased pressure on the other bases 
in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan itself, reducing the administra-
tion’s political maneuverability.294 In addition, K2 was used as 
a logistical hub: transferring airlifted cargo to container trucks 
which could reach US bases inside Afghanistan. The overland 
route fed by the cargo planes represented the only road access 
into Afghanistan available to the US.295 The airfi eld was deemed 
“undeniably critical in supporting our combat operations” by the 
Pentagon.296 Some reports suggest the Bush administration were 
in negotiations to secure the use of K2 as a cooperative security 
location (CSL), a facility housing military equipment and some 
contract personnel, but few or no troops.297 This would suggest 
plans for a permanent (though less central) role for the air base. 
The initial weak response by the US to the Uzbek government’s 
actions in Andijan, occurring in the middle of ongoing base 
negotiations between the two countries, also points toward incon-
sistencies in US policy. The mute response was perhaps intended 
to lessen Andijan’s impact on the ongoing basing talks, but in ter-
national pressures again may have forced the administration’s hand 
on the issue. US statements concerning the violence in Andijan 
sounded less like a country pressing for human rights and more 
like one attempting to keep a balanced and measured response. 
State Department offi cial L. Nicholas Burns claimed the US “made 
a clear choice, and that was to stand on the side of human rights,” 
when US involvement in the refugee airlift was followed by the 
eviction notice for K2, implying that the US knew this would be 
the consequence of such an action and proceeded nevertheless.298 
However, disagreements over payments for Karshi-Khanabad and 
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negotiations over its continued use had dragged on for nearly two 
years by the time the Andijan violence occurred. This fact, coupled 
with the weak initial US response to Andijan most likely intended 
to save the negotiating process, sheds doubt on the accuracy of the 
State Department’s announcement about ‘choosing’ human rights 
in the matter.
US policy during this period revealed competing factions with-
in the foreign policy establishment and exhibited both realist and 
liberalist components. Due to a lack of policy coordination, these 
two factions worked against each other much of the time. The 
realists in the Pentagon and the White House saw their efforts 
to placate the Karimov regime consistently frustrated by other ac-
tors. For example, the application of normative stipulations on 
military aid to Uzbekistan through the certifi cation process re-
pre sented the placement of a liberalist concept over realist policy 
actions. The realists would rather not have such restrictions.299 The 
threat of decertifi cation made the military aid less dependable and 
therefore less attractive to target countries, which in turn made 
the aid and the decertifi cation leverage less effective. This could be 
one factor in Karimov’s abrupt turn toward Moscow after 2003. 
In addition, US efforts to assist the Andijan refugees, knowing it 
risked alienating a key ally in the region and putting the future 
of the US base at further risk, cannot be explained from a realist 
perspective. If the US were to fi rst engage in actions detrimental to 
US-Uzbek relations, increased pressure for internal reform would 
have longer-term effects than the refugee crisis. Why engage in 
risky behavior for issues that do little to further US interests? 
It appeared that international pressures to condemn the Uzbek 
regime and conduct an independent investigation factored 
into the US response. These actions are clearly infl uenced by a 
more liberalist faction that, just as the realists had encountered 
299 The realist approach of the Pentagon is evident in this observation from Meppen: 
“Karimov maintained confi dence, however, in his personal relationship with 
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liberalist interference, also met with resistance when pursuing its 
agenda. Congressional legislation concerning the 2002 Strategic 
Partnership Agreement leveraged concrete reforms against 
continued aid. This linkage was opposed by the White House and 
apparently by the State Department as well. The State Department 
decertifi ed Uzbekistan in December 2003 for CTR funding but 
a presidential waiver allowed the funding to continue. After a 
security waiver was intentionally left out of the 2004 legislation, 
the State Department decertifi ed Uzbekistan and aid was cut. 
Again, however, the White House and the Pentagon circumvented 
this process by awarding aid from other sources. Congressional 
efforts to block the $23 million for K2 failed after the Defense 
Department outmaneuvered them. Lastly, echoing Strobe Talbott’s 
1997 speech, the State De partment continued to insist that the 
US hoped to move away from geopolitics and power balancing. 
Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried declared as recently as 
October 2005: “we do not look at Central Asia as an object in a 
great game. We do not look at this as a zero sum contest between 
us, the Russians and Chi nese”.300
This phase in US-Uzbek relations most clearly exhibits the 
struggle to reconcile security interests with human rights concerns. 
The period 2004–05 perhaps best illustrates the chaotic and 
some times incoherent realities of foreign policy and national res-
ponses to crisis. Events in 2005 developed rapidly and gave the 
US little time to prepare a coordinated, coherent response. The 
stakes were high for multiple US interests: basing rights, regio nal 
infl uence, international prestige, and human rights. Policymakers 
in Washington were split between those advocating a more rea list 
approach and those pressing for a liberalist policy. It is in this fi nal 
period that the infl uence of theoretical foundations in shaping for-
eign policy is best observed and illustrated. Uncoordinated efforts 
by various actors within the US foreign policy establishment ma-
neuvered to infl uence US actions according to their respective be-
liefs. The result was an ineffective mix of actors working at cross-
300 “Press Conference of the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian 
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purposes and the eventual inability of all actors to accomplish 
their respective policy goals.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
General observations on balancing in US 
foreign policy
Balancing the three policy concerns of human rights, democracy 
promotion and security occurred on two distinct levels during the 
period studied. The president, in his role as chief diplomat, had 
the most immediate and wide-reaching infl uence on foreign poli-
cy decisions. He set the tone for US policy through various de-
cisions on such matters as diplomatic visits, criticism or praise in 
speeches, and budget proposals sent to Congress. Through these 
actions, the White House integrated human rights, democracy and 
security in its policy positions, and when confl icting interests made 
a smooth integration impossible, the president prioritized some 
issues at the expense of others. In general, the president has been 
the most visible and most infl uential force in US foreign affairs, 
but certainly not the only one and perhaps not the most infl uential 
in US-Uzbek relations. Although the administration formally 
conducted American foreign policy and purported to balance the 
three issues discussed in this study, they were often balanced only 
in a rhetorical sense and focused on the ‘big picture’. Many of the 
important policy actions examined in this study involved lower-
level administration offi cials or members of Congress exercising 
their infl uence through speeches, hearings, legislation, certifi cation 
processes, budget appropriations, and other oversight measures.
This more complex level of issue balancing resulted from a 
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process whereby competing factions in Washington jockeyed to 
get their agendas incorporated into US policy. The various agen-
cies of the government that dealt in day-to-day diplomacy took 
many lesser decisions that comprised the bulk of American foreign 
policy. Various actors within the US policymaking establishment 
contributed to policy formation, including the White House (the 
president and, just as importantly, the group of advisors sur-
rounding the president), the State Department, the Defense De-
partment, and the US Congress. Among non-state actors, NGOs 
and academic institutions that publish articles on policy issues 
and offer expert testimony before Congress were among the most 
signifi cant. The independent media focused the public’s attention 
on certain issues. Various interest groups also generated private 
and public pressures to further their causes. Nevertheless, those 
most directly responsible for US policy were the aforementioned 
governmental actors, each pursuing a mix of realist- or liberalist-
oriented agendas. When there was little to fi ght over, supporters of 
the two perspectives were not readily identifi able and acted more 
or less as one. When clear interests emerged for each of the factions 
and those interests diverged, the strain of fi nding common ground 
for a unifi ed foreign policy became discernible. This process of 
integrating diverging views on policy direction constitutes the 
second means of balancing security with more the normative issues 
of democracy and human rights. 
Comparing the conclusions to the empirical 
data 
In the earlier discussion on American foreign policy, three pos-
sible interpretations were presented: a ‘realist’ perspective where 
se curity issues and the national interest reigned supreme, a ‘li be-
ralist’ view that prioritized democracy promotion and human 
rights, and Carothers’ ‘semi-realist’ middle ground where liberalist 
priorities were included when no pressing security concerns were 
present. Based on the conclusions reached in the previous section, 
any attempt to classify US policy under such broad categories 
would be an oversimplifi cation of the empirical data. However, 
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these broad brushstrokes provide a type of shorthand by which the 
political perspectives of the various actors involved in US policy 
can be categorized. Indeed, the ‘semi-realist’ designation appears 
to mesh quite well with the policies and actions of both President 
Clinton and President Bush. With this in mind, a brief summation 
of the empirical data will now be presented, based the general 
conclusions presented in the previous section and keeping in mind 
the three interpretations of US foreign policy.
Lacking any perceived security interests in Uzbekistan, the 
Clinton administration pressed Tashkent on human rights issues 
in this fi rst period from 1995–97, and the rhetoric from the White 
House was loaded with the liberalist language of democra cy 
promotion. Inconsistent policy was seen from the president and 
the Pentagon: as Clinton snubbed Karimov, Secretary Perry of-
fered warm words of support. Whether this represented a true rift 
between the White House and Defense Department or a consci ous 
policy decision is diffi cult to ascertain. As the State Department 
argued for a departure from power balancing in the region, the 
Pentagon demonstrated its military capabilities through training 
exercises with other Central Asian countries. The beginnings of 
a bilateral relationship formed during this period as Uzbekistan’s 
importance to regional stability began to resonate in Washington.
After the US embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998, the 
Clinton Administration recognized the advantages of Uzbek co-
operation in the hunt for Osama bin Laden and toned down its 
criticism accordingly. For the next several years, policy balancing 
emanated from the White House and with little disagreement 
among other competing foreign policy actors. Congress focused 
pri marily on Caspian energy resources and Islamic radicalism 
and the Pentagon pressed for and received increased security co-
operation with Uzbekistan. The State Department continued to 
issue its annual country reports on human rights, but even they 
were muted in comparison to the worsening domestic situation in 
Uzbekistan. Pragmatism was the order of the day. Only in the fi nal 
year of the Clinton administration did the tough criticism return 
during Secretary of State Albright’s Tashkent speech. Even then, 
however, the US balanced its criticism by awarding $3 million in 
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security assistance to Uzbekistan.
Interestingly, US policy toward Uzbekistan after 9/11 continued 
to exhibit elements of liberalism even as America focused over-
whelmingly on security issues. The Bush administration negotiated 
the use of the strategically important airbase at Karshi-Khanabad for 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan while the president’s 
speeches were loaded with the liberalist language of freedom and 
democracy. The White House’s policy balancing act included all 
three issues of human rights, democracy, and security in its foreign 
policy. This pleased supporters of both realist and liberalist ap-
proaches, as there was literally ‘something for everyone’ in this 
policy, formalized in the 2002 Strategic Partnership Agreement 
between the two countries. In purely practical terms, however, 
human rights criticisms were toned down as high-level US offi cials 
failed to comment on the obvious lack of substantial reforms by 
the Karimov regime. Reports of extraordinary rendition called into 
question the US commitment to human rights and the rule of law. 
The realists, pleased with the use of K2, tried to keep the Uzbek 
government content. Meanwhile, the liberalist faction remained 
hopeful that Tashkent would honor its commitments to reform 
embodied in the 2002 agreement. The stage was now set for the 
US policy meltdown that was to come in the following years.
President Karimov’s crackdown on US-funded NGOs in res-
ponse to the Ukrainian and Georgian ‘color revolutions’ of 2003 
and 2004, along with Tashkent’s constant complaints for more 
compensation for the use of K2, sent US-Uzbek relations on a 
downward spiral from 2004–2005. It also revealed the clear splits 
that existed in US policymaking circles. The White House balanced 
the issues rhetorically by including some criticisms of the Karimov 
regime in its statements, but with little real prioritizing of anything 
other than security concerns. A more liberalist faction within the 
State Department reacted to the NGO restrictions by decertifying 
Uzbekistan for some security aid. Their hand forced, the White 
House waived the initial decertifi cation and CTR funding continued 
to fl ow. Congress then passed legislation linking security aid to re-
forms promised in the Strategic Partnership Agreement and did 
not include a national security waiver. 
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After the State Department failed to certify Tashkent’s com-
pliance with the agreement, the White House was forced to cut 
security-related funding. The Pentagon, concerned that the K2 
base would be threatened, openly criticized the decertifi cation 
and scrambled to fi nd funds with which to placate the Karimov 
re gime. The stakes were high in this policy fi ght and the different 
approaches (often working at cross-purposes) by the White House, 
State Department and the Pentagon could not possibly represent a 
coordinated policy. With large and steadily growing cracks in the 
relationship, the violence in Andijan shattered what was left of US-
Uzbek relations. Such egregious human rights violations as those 
that occurred in May 2005 could not be casually dismissed by the 
US, and an already strained relationship reached its breaking point. 
The Bush administration seemed more willing to openly criticize 
the Karimov regime after Tashkent asked US forces to leave the 
country, and have since that time pressed for an investigation into 
Andijan. Despite the K2 eviction notice and the abrupt halt to 
Uzbek cooperation with the US, the Pentagon sought to pay the 
Karimov regime $23 million while Congress struggled to halt the 
payment.
The varying approaches taken by Washington during these four 
periods in US-Uzbek relations revealed a semi-realist balancing 
of security, democracy and human rights by the White House. In 
its entirety, however, US policy cannot be categorized so neatly. 
When one factors in the various actions of the State Department 
(decertifying Uzbekistan for CTR funds in 2003/2004 and again in 
connection with congressional legislation in 2004), the Pentagon 
(criticizing the aid cuts and unilaterally providing funds to the 
Uzbek government), and Congress (passing legislation to limit for-
eign assistance to Uzbekistan, pressing for an investigation into 
Andijan, and pushing for the withholding of fi nal payments to 
Tashkent for K2), the balancing seems much less coordinated. The 
obvious tensions and confl icts within the American foreign policy 
community led to a set of often contradictory policy decisions 
that ultimately affected Washington’s ability to achieve its policy 
goals. 
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Lessons learned from the US experience in 
Uzbekistan
There are several general themes in US policy that can be drawn 
from the empirical data. The fi rst deals with US policy regarding 
foreign military basing in authoritarian countries and the dangers 
inherent in such an action. Secondly, US policy regarding democracy 
promotion in Uzbekistan will be examined to reach some con-
clusions on the pitfalls of building democracy in autocracies. 
Finally, the broad issue of US policy in the region, given US policy 
towards Uzbekistan, will be considered.
Maintaining military bases in authoritarian countries
After the establishment of a US airbase at Karshi-Khanabad, US 
offi cials argued that K2 gave the US increased leverage with the 
Karimov regime to press for reforms.301 After several years, it 
became obvious that the reverse was in fact true: the US stepped 
lightly around the abuses and lack of reforms by Karimov due 
to the base’s importance to US military planners. The weak US 
response in the wake of the Andijan violence, which occurred 
du ring the ‘last chance’ phase of base negotiations, was further 
confi rmation of the linkage. This dynamic, where the small state in 
effect can dictate the terms of its relationship with a great power, 
runs counter to the conventional ‘might-is-right’ rules of power 
politics. President Karimov actively courted American involvement 
in Uzbekistan during the 1990s, realized the relationship wasn’t 
providing the benefi ts he had hoped within a year of signing the 
2002 Strategic Partnership Agreement, and then began a process of 
rapprochement with Moscow. Much of the US-Uzbek relationship 
depended upon the actions and signals by President Karimov rather 
than by US policy, although Washington’s uncoordinated policies 
exacerbated the problem. 
The eviction highlighted another problem with autocrats as 
301 Balancing Military Assistance and Support for Human Rights in Central Asia, J.D. 
Crouch’s testimony; Paula J. Dobriansky, “Democracy Promotion: Explaining the 
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Democracy Promotion (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2004): 75–79.
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hosts: they are fi ckle and unpredictable. As Alexander Cooley 
observes, “agreements with an authoritarian state last only as long 
as the ruling regime does – if even that long – because the status 
of such treaties is subject to the regime’s fortunes rather than to a 
lasting institution framework”.302 Lacking institutionalization of 
the basing agreement, the US was left completely dependent up on 
remaining in the good graces of President Karimov.303 Finally, US 
bases in authoritarian countries like Uzbekistan attract the ire of 
radical domestic opposition groups who see the US as supporting 
the host country’s repression, a situation that undermines US se-
curity.304 Choosing to base US forces in more pluralistic countries 
might better ensure the country’s long term security and help 
avoid policy confl icts with human rights and democracy building 
issues.
Democracy promotion
Democracy promotion in authoritarian countries such as Uz be-
kistan can be challenging, if not impossible. Diplomatic pressure 
from the US to reform, even if successful, results in superfi cial 
measures that can be rescinded by presidential decree at any time. 
The authoritarian nature of regimes such as Karimov’s precludes 
any lasting institutional changes that may survive the changing 
whims of the autocrat. Even legally binding documents such con-
stitutions and treaties were routinely fl outed by Karimov. Working 
to promote changes from the bottom up in a grassroots approach 
has become even more challenging after the so-called color 
revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. 
As Carothers argues, US involvement in these events, along with 
302 Cooley, “Base Politics”, p.85.
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wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to install democratic governments 
and a constant barrage of democracy rhetoric from the US, has 
led autocratic governments to link democracy promotion with 
regime change.305 In this, the autocrats are correct: democracy 
promotion technically aims to replace their authoritarian regimes 
with pluralistic ones. Many autocratic leaders are questioning the 
wisdom of allowing US-funded NGOs to operate in their countries 
for this purpose, what Carothers calls in the title of his article the 
“backlash against democracy promotion”, and scores of NGOs 
have been forced close as they did in Uzbekistan. Carothers argues 
against the “instrumentalization of pro-democracy policies – 
wrapping security goals in the language of democracy promotion 
and then confusing democracy promotion with the search 
for particular political outcomes that enhance those security 
objectives.306 Attempts by the US to combine democracy-building 
efforts with its security interests can lead to these types of unclear, 
counterproductive or outright disingenuous democracy policies.
US policy in Central Asia
US policy can, at the very least, be criticized for its incoherent 
and fragmented nature in Uzbekistan, but larger issues are even 
more disconcerting. The Cold War was for decades the main 
focus of US foreign policy, and its abrupt end left the US without 
a suitable security framework to replace it until the US foreign 
policy establishment seized upon terrorism as the new global 
security threat after 2001. Combined with Cold War mistrust of 
Russia, the realist faction in the US looked toward Central Asia 
as a continuation of the ‘Great Game’ despite statements by the 
State Department encouraging a view beyond the zero-sum game 
scenario. The Russians seemed to still be playing a game of the 
zero-sum variety, maneuvering for infl uence in the Central Asian 
countries throughout the period studied here. Despite obvious 
common interests in addressing Islamic extremism, drug traffi cking 
and regional instability, the US and Russia did not cooperate with 
305 Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion”, Foreign Affairs 
vol. 85, no. 2 (2006): 55–68.
306 Carothers, Critical Mission, p.71.
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one another on these issues. The Russian anti-terrorism base in 
Kyrgyzstan sits less than thirty kilometers from the US base at 
Manas, a testament to the parallel strategies pursued by both 
countries.
In addition, the US tendency to favor bilateral agreements over 
regional and multilateral arrangements arguably contributed to 
an unnecessary balance of power environment in the region. By 
aligning itself so closely with Uzbekistan for reasons of strategic 
convenience, the neighboring countries of Kyrgyzstan and Taji-
kistan may have felt inclined to nurture relations with Russia 
given Uzbekistan’s aggressive behavior toward its neighbors 
re gar ding border disputes, trading policies and cross border in-
cursions by the IMU. Tajikistan’s existing close ties with Russia 
were reaffi rmed with an economic package and a new Russian 
military base, Kyrgyzstan agreed to the Russian counterterrorism 
base after US-Uzbekistan ties strengthened in 2002, and with 
thousands of kilometers of territory bordering Russia, Kazakhstan 
also continued its good relations with Moscow.307 After the K2 
eviction, Tashkent’s abrupt end to cooperation with the US, and 
the recent strengthening of ties between Russia and Uzbekistan, 
the US has found itself shut out of Central Asia. Even the base at 
Manas, Kyrgyzstan is threatened as President Bakiev has pressed 
for a staggering rent hike for continued US use of the airport, 
from $2 million to $207 million.308 The reliance on bilateral 
agreements and diplomatic efforts, while necessary for detailed 
basing agreements and other cooperative efforts, carries with it 
the inherent weakness of complete dependence upon that country 
to facilitate US foreign policy actions.
The Future of US Policy in Central Asia
Even a superpower like the US cannot control every environment 
and infl uence every outcome, especially when the region in 
question lies halfway around the world. At the most basic level, 
effective US foreign policy requires access and opportunity in order 
to work toward its political goals in a country. These conditions 
307 See Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia”.
308 BBC News, “Kyrgyzstan Seeks US Base Hike”, 15 February 2006.
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are now absent in Uzbekistan, where most avenues of political 
action are presently closed to the US. An ineffective mix of policy 
prioritization has left Washington without any political leverage 
across its spectrum of interests in the country. Throughout the past 
year, Uzbekistan has continued to rekindle its relationships in the 
region, sharply avoiding any engagement with the West. In March, 
Uzbekistan joined the Eurasia Economic Community (EEC), 
thereby signaling closer economic ties to some of the former CIS 
countries. President Karimov attended the yearly summit of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June, which was 
followed closely by Tashkent’s rejoining of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) in August, a group it had left in 1999 
amid strengthening ties to the US and the West. This fl urry of 
diplomatic activity represents a positive movement toward regio nal 
cooperation while its timing signals a desire to distance itself from 
the United States. In the wake of Andijan, the Uzbek authorities 
have continued their pattern of blatant human rights violations, 
repressed religious expression, and conducted show trials for those 
implicated in the Andijan unrest. Several American-funded NGOs 
were forced to close during 2006, including the well-regarded 
organization Counterpart International. Freedom House reduced 
Uzbekistan’s civil liberties rating in 2006 from six to seven (the 
worst), and with a rating of seven in political rights the country is 
now ranked as one of the most repressive in the world, alongside 
Burma, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and neighboring 
Turkmenistan. 
The United States remained active in Central Asia after its exit 
from Uzbekistan, demonstrated in 2006 by a diplomatic visit by 
Vice President Cheney to Kazakhstan, stops in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and a recent meeting 
between newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State Richard 
Boucher and President Karimov in Tashkent. References to Ka-
zakhstan as a ‘regional anchor’ and diplomatic gestures toward 
Kyrgyzstan amid the renegotiation of US basing arrangements 
highlights the importance of these two countries to future US 
involvement in the region. During congressional testimony in 
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April 2006, Boucher laid out a reformulated Central Asian policy 
that retained some familiar themes:
Our strategy rests on three integrated pillars: security cooperation; 
our commercial and energy interests; and political and economic 
reform. We see these three pillars as mutually reinforcing. Genuine 
stability, in our view, requires a process of democratic change, 
and stability, in turn, provides for economic development and 
prosperity. Thus, we are determined to pursue all three sets of 
interests simultaneously in a balanced way.309
It remains to be seen whether the US can effectively combine these 
policy goals in a broader regional context after Washington’s failed 
attempts at precisely such a balancing act in Uzbekistan.
309 US Policy in Central Asia: Balancing Priorities Part II, Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House Committee on 
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